Mere presence does not attract Section 34 IPC absent proved participation in common intention.

On 30 September 2015 at approximately 1:00 p.m., Arun Chaudhary was sitting in an orchard belonging to Kedar Nath Sah when his mother, Sharda Devi—the informant—went to call him for lunch.

The prosecution alleged that Mahendra Chaudhary, his wife Sharda Devi, and their sons arrived together; Sundesh Chaudhary was carrying an axe, Mahendra exhorted him to kill Arun, and Sundesh repeatedly assaulted Arun on the head, neck, chest, and abdomen, causing his death at the spot.

The post-mortem disclosed multiple sharp-cut injuries, including a deep abdominal wound with protrusion of the intestine, and the doctor opined that death resulted from hypovolemic shock due to excessive haemorrhage.

The Trial Court convicted all three appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000, while acquitting them under Section 120-B read with Section 34 IPC.

In appeal, the defence challenged the reliability of the eyewitnesses, the alleged motive, the non-examination of the Investigating Officer, the non-production of the axe, the absence of forensic evidence, the proof of the place of occurrence, and the rejection of the alibi.

Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Sundesh Chaudhary inflicted the fatal sharp-edged weapon injuries upon Arun Chaudhary?

Whether Mahendra Chaudhary’s alleged exhortation and participation established the common intention required to impose vicarious liability under Section 34 IPC?

Whether the evidence proved that Sharda Devi shared the common intention and participated in the criminal act, notwithstanding the absence of any specific weapon or exhortation attributed to her?

Whether the non-examination of the Investigating Officer, non-production of the alleged axe, and absence of forensic examination created a reasonable doubt requiring acquittal?

Whether the prosecution established the charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B read with Section 34 IPC?

The Court applied Sections 302 and 34 IPC: Section 302 punishes murder, while Section 34 imposes joint liability where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of their common intention; a separate overt act by every accused is not indispensable, but both common intention and participation must be proved, and common intention may develop at the scene.

Relying on Suresh v. State of U.P., (2001) 3 SCC 673, the Court held that common intention is inferred from the facts, conduct, and surrounding circumstances, and that mere presence is insufficient.

Under Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364, relationship with the deceased does not by itself disqualify a witness; the evidence must be assessed on its intrinsic reliability.

Following Behari Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1996) 2 SCC 317, non-examination of the Investigating Officer is not automatically fatal and prejudice must be established on the facts of the case.

The Court further applied the principle, reiterated in Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 307, that recovery or production of the weapon is not a sine qua non for conviction where credible ocular and medical evidence otherwise proves the offence.

Criminal conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to commit the offence and cannot be inferred merely from joint presence or participation in the occurrence.

The Court treated PW-10’s presence as natural because she had gone to the orchard to call her son for lunch, and accepted her specific account that Mahendra exhorted Sundesh and that Sundesh immediately assaulted Arun.

Although PWs.1–9 broadly supported the prosecution, their admissions showed that several had arrived only after the assault and therefore their evidence was principally relevant to the aftermath, not necessarily to the actual assault.

The medical evidence substantially corroborated PW-10’s account of repeated sharp-edged weapon injuries.

The alleged illicit-liquor motive was treated as a material improvement absent from the earliest version and was excluded, but the Court held that absence of motive did not defeat an otherwise proved murder.

The Investigating Officer’s death, non-production of the axe, and absence of forensic examination were investigative deficiencies but did not cause sufficient demonstrated prejudice or undermine the consistent ocular and medical evidence.

Mahendra’s alleged exhortation was considered a specific and proximate act directly connected with the assault, supporting common intention under Section 34 IPC.

By contrast, the evidence against Sharda consisted substantially of presence with the group and uncorroborated general allegations of participation; no weapon, exhortation, or sufficiently reliable conduct was attributed to her. Mere presence could not establish common intention beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, the prosecution proved no agreement, its timing, or its manner of formation sufficient to sustain the conspiracy charge.

Mahendra Chaudhary’s conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were also affirmed because his exhortation and participation established common intention.

Sharda Devi’s conviction and sentence were set aside, and she was acquitted by extending the benefit of reasonable doubt; if not required in any other case, she was directed to be released forthwith.

The acquittal of all accused under Section 120-B read with Section 34 IPC was maintained.

The period of custody already undergone by Sundesh and Mahendra was directed to be set off in accordance with law, and the fine and default sentence remained subject to the stated modification.