An appointment based on a forged marksheet is void ab initio, despite lengthy service.

Punam Kumari appealed against the judgment setting aside her appointment as a Panchayat Teacher in Gram Panchayat Raj Dumariya.

Her selection was based on marks attributed to her in the Intermediate examination.

Sunita Kumari, the writ petitioner, alleged that Punam had actually obtained 384 out of 900 marks (42.66%), rather than the 72.77% reflected in the selection record.

Punam admitted before the District Appellate Authority that she had obtained 384 marks.

The District and State Appellate Authorities rejected Sunita’s challenge, principally on delay; the Single Judge later set aside those orders and Punam’s appointment, but declined to direct Sunita’s appointment because she lacked the requisite teachers’ training.

Punam’s Letters Patent Appeal challenged that decision, including on grounds of delay and the finding concerning the marks-sheet.

1. Whether the Single Judge was justified in setting aside Punam’s appointment upon finding that it had been secured on the basis of a forged and fabricated marks-sheet

2. Whether delay in challenging the appointment, or Punam’s period of service, warranted sustaining the appointment

3. Whether the Single Judge improperly directed Sunita’s appointment in Punam’s place

The Court applied the principle fraus omnia corrumpit—fraud vitiates the proceeding—and held that an appointment obtained through forged documents or misrepresentation is void ab initio and does not create an equity in the appointee’s favour.

It relied on Jainendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 8 SCC 748, concerning appointments procured through forged documents; Vijay Kishanrao Kurundkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 834, on appointments based on fraudulent certificates being void ab initio; and Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India v. Jagdish Balram Bahira, (2017) 8 SCC 670.

The Court also applied the principle that passage of time or length of service does not validate an appointment founded on fraud.

It noted that Section 23(2) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, and the notification dated 9 August 2017 were relevant to the writ petitioner’s training qualification.

The Court found that Punam’s merit position depended on the marks attributed to her in the Intermediate examination, but the record showed that she had obtained 384 out of 900 marks, and she had admitted those marks before the District Appellate Authority.

The discrepancy undermined the foundation of her selection and supported the Single Judge’s finding that the appointment rested on a forged or fabricated marks-sheet.

The Court rejected the delay argument because Sunita had approached the High Court in 2012 and thereafter pursued the remedies identified by the Court and the appellate authorities; Punam’s length of service could not cure an appointment founded on fraud.

Nor had the Single Judge substituted Sunita for Punam: the Court had declined to order Sunita’s appointment because she lacked the requisite training.

Finding no error, perversity, or material misappreciation warranting interference in the intra-court appeal, it dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal and made no order as to costs; any interlocutory applications were also disposed of.