An association’s General Secretary cannot terminate employees without authority vested in its Board.

The plaintiff, a YMCA employee who had served as a Senior Secretary, challenged his suspension dated 25 April 2023 and termination dated 31 October 2024, alleging that the General Secretary acted without authority of the Board of Directors and contrary to the Association’s bye-laws and personnel policies

The trial court found the suspension and termination procedurally improper but kept the termination in abeyance and directed the plaintiff to approach the Board for fresh consideration

The plaintiff appealed, seeking the orders to be set aside and full relief granted

1. Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the suspension and termination orders were illegal and perverse

2. Whether, having found the orders improper, the trial court was correct to keep the termination in abeyance rather than set it aside

3. Whether the trial court’s judgment and decree required modification or interference

The appeal was brought under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure

The Court applied the Association’s bye-laws, rules and regulations, written constitution, and Personnel Policy Book, which it construed as vesting disciplinary decision-making authority in the Board of Directors rather than the General Secretary

It also applied the principles of natural justice, holding that disciplinary action required a proper inquiry and compliance with the Association’s governing procedures

The judgment refers to a Supreme Court order concerning interim relief in a contract of service, but provides no case name or citation; it records that the Supreme Court had observed that an injunction in such a contract could not be granted

The evidence showed that the General Secretary issued the suspension and termination orders without prior Board approval, and the Association did not establish that the Board had met in full quorum and taken the decisions as required by its rules

The Court also found that the subsequent ratification relied upon by the Association did not cure the procedural defect, and that the record disclosed no proper inquiry, in breach of natural justice

Because the Association itself was a party, represented by its General Secretary, the Board did not need to be separately impleaded; accordingly, the trial court erred in directing the plaintiff to return to the Board instead of setting aside the defective orders

The Association was directed to restore the plaintiff to the position he held on the date of suspension, stated in the decree as Secretary, and to pay salary, emoluments, facilities, and other monetary benefits until superannuation; any pension or gratuity payable under applicable rules was also to be granted. The monetary benefits were directed to be paid within four weeks of receipt of the order, with no order as to costs