An easement of necessity requires pleadings and proof that no alternative access exists.

The plaintiff sued for a permanent injunction concerning land recorded in his ownership and possession; the defendants admitted his ownership but claimed a right of way over the land, asserting that it was their only access to their house and that they had used it for many years

The trial court decreed the suit, but the first appellate court reversed that decree, relying on a document described as a police compromise

In this second appeal, the plaintiff challenged the appellate court’s findings on the alleged easement and the compromise

Whether the first appellate court’s finding that the defendants had a right of passage by necessity was unsupported by the pleadings and evidence

Whether the first appellate court could base its finding regarding the defendants’ right of passage on a compromise made before the police

The court’s reasoning turned on the requirements for establishing an easement of necessity: the claimant must plead and prove the essential facts supporting the claimed necessity, including the absence of another passage.

A document relied on to establish a right must sufficiently identify the subject matter to connect it to the disputed right.

The appellants invoked Sections 13, 15 and 47–51 of the Easements Act, but the judgment does not set out or apply those provisions individually

No precedent was cited.

The court found the defendants’ pleadings and evidence insufficient to establish that the disputed path was their only access.

The defendants’ spot map did not depict the situation adequately, and the Local Commissioner reported two passages at the site—one motorable and one pedestrian; defence witnesses also acknowledged a Panchayat-maintained passage

The alleged compromise was vague and did not describe the land or passage in dispute, so it could not support the first appellate court’s finding of a right over the plaintiff’s land

set aside the first appellate court’s judgment and decree, and restored the trial court’s decree permanently restraining the defendants from interfering with the suit land

The appeal was allowed