An employee cannot challenge his date of birth at retirement after relying on his matriculation certificate.

The petitioner, an employee of South Eastern Coal Fields Limited, challenged the order dated 18 January 2017 by which he was superannuated with immediate effect, treating his date of birth as 5 July 1955, as recorded in his matriculation certificate.

The petitioner contended that his service record recorded his date of birth as 7 October 1960, allegedly on the basis of a medical report, and that he was therefore entitled to continue in service until 31 October 2020.

The respondent-employer submitted that the petitioner had initially declared himself illiterate and had entered service as a General Mazdoor. Subsequently, for obtaining promotion to the post of Clerk, he himself submitted his matriculation certificate, which recorded his date of birth as 5 July 1955; the promotion was granted on that basis.

The respondents relied upon Implementation Instruction No. 76 dated 25 April 1988, under which the matriculation certificate constituted the best evidence of date of birth.

Whether the petitioner could challenge his date of birth at the fag end of service and seek continuation in employment on the basis of an alternative date recorded in the service record, despite having relied upon his matriculation certificate for promotion?

Whether the matriculation certificate recording the petitioner’s date of birth as 5 July 1955 was the legally applicable and reliable basis for his superannuation?

Whether the impugned superannuation order was invalid because it had allegedly been issued or circulated by an incompetent authority?

Under Article 226 of the Constitution, interference with a service-record entry concerning date of birth is warranted only where the employee establishes, within the prescribed or a reasonable period, a clear and conclusive case of erroneous recording supported by irrefutable evidence.

Courts must be cautious because alteration of the date of birth may affect the promotional rights of other employees.

The Court relied principally on State of Gujarat v. Vali Mohd. Dosabhai Sindhi, (2006) 6 SCC 537, which reiterated the principles in R. Kirubakaran, T.V. Venugopalan, and State of Orissa v. Ramanath Patnaik that a belated claim for correction of date of birth, particularly near retirement, ordinarily cannot be entertained where the employee failed to seek correction during service.

The Court also applied Implementation Instruction No. 76 dated 25 April 1988 and Regulation BI(a), under which a matriculation certificate is the best evidence of date of birth, with reference to an Age Determination Committee or Medical Board only where such cogent documentary evidence is unavailable.

The decision in Shankar Lal v. Hindustan Copper Limited, Civil Appeal No. 2858 of 2022, was distinguished because that case involved an employee who had no earlier occasion to challenge an inconsistent date of birth recorded in Form B.

The Court found that the petitioner did not dispute the authenticity or ownership of the matriculation certificate recording his date of birth as 5 July 1955.

More significantly, he had himself submitted that certificate to obtain promotion to the post of Clerk and had thereby accepted its evidentiary value for service purposes.

Having obtained a service benefit on the basis of the certificate, he could not selectively reject the same date of birth when it resulted in superannuation.

The alternative date of 7 October 1960 appearing in the service record was insufficient to displace the matriculation certificate, particularly since the petitioner had not challenged the entry during the relevant period of service and raised the dispute only when retirement became imminent.

The factual basis of Shankar Lal was materially different and therefore did not assist the petitioner.

The Court further held that the retirement order was not vitiated by incompetence of authority because it had been recommended by the competent authority and merely circulated by a subordinate authority.

It held that the matriculation certificate recording 5 July 1955 was the applicable and reliable date of birth for service purposes, and that the petitioner could not raise a belated contrary claim based on the service-book entry, particularly after relying on the matriculation certificate for promotion.

The impugned order dated 18 January 2017 was held neither illegal nor without jurisdiction.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs, and no relief of reinstatement, arrears, continuity, seniority, or extension of service was granted.