An employer cannot unilaterally alter a settled service-book birth date without observing natural justice.

The petitioner, appointed as a Peon-cum-Khansama (Cook) in the Police Hospital, Nawada on 21 August 1978, had his Service Book prepared in 1995, recording his date of birth as 16 May 1959 on the basis of a School Transfer Certificate issued in 1977.

Relying on an Age-Service Register and an alleged Medical Board assessment fixing his birth year as 1955, the respondents directed his superannuation with effect from 30 June 2015.

The petitioner contended that the alteration was made without notice, disclosure of the Medical Board report, or an opportunity of hearing, and sought quashing of the retirement order, continuation in service up to 16 May 2019, and arrears of salary.

During the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner crossed the claimed date of superannuation; consequently, physical reinstatement was no longer feasible.

Whether the respondents were justified in altering the petitioner’s established date of birth in the Service Book from 16 May 1959 to the year 1955 on the basis of an ex parte Medical Board assessment and an Age-Service Register entry?

Whether the respondents could prematurely superannuate the petitioner on 30 June 2015 without issuing notice, supplying the Medical Board report, or providing an opportunity of hearing?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to be treated as having continued in service up to 31 May 2019 and to receive salary and consequential retiral benefits?

The Court applied Rules 96 and 97 of the Bihar Financial Rules, under which the date of birth recorded in the Service Book ordinarily cannot be altered except for clerical error and, where age has been deduced at appointment or attestation, the matter need not be reopened.

It relied on State of U.P. v. Shiv Narain Upadhyaya, (2005) 6 SCC 49, for the principle that settled service-record entries should not be reopened after long delay and that service records must provide certainty regarding superannuation.

It further relied on Shankar Lal v. Hindustan Copper Limited, (2022) 6 SCC 211, holding that the employer is equally prohibited from unilaterally altering an age entry at the fag end of service to the employee’s detriment.

The Court also referred to Jai Nath Tiwari v. State of Bihar, 2019 (3) BLJ 632, for the proposition that the limitation applicable to an employee’s request for correction cannot justify an employer’s unilateral alteration of a contemporaneous and accepted service-book entry without due process.

The principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem, require notice and a reasonable opportunity of hearing before an administrative decision producing adverse civil consequences.

The Court found that the petitioner’s Service Book had been formally prepared by the authorities in 1995 and recorded his date of birth as 16 May 1959 on the basis of contemporaneous educational evidence.

The respondents failed to demonstrate that any formal proceeding had been initiated to cancel or modify that entry, or that notice and an opportunity of hearing had been provided before relying on the Medical Board assessment.

Applying Rules 96 and 97 and the cited Supreme Court authorities, the Court held that the respondents could not reopen the settled entry decades later through an ex parte medical assessment, particularly when the alteration shortened the petitioner’s service by approximately four years.

The resulting superannuation order therefore violated natural justice and constituted arbitrary State action under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Since the petitioner had already crossed the legitimate date of retirement, physical reinstatement was not ordered.

Instead, the respondents were directed to treat him as having remained in continuous service up to 31 May 2019, pay full salary and allowances for the period from 1 July 2015 to 31 May 2019, and recalculate and release his pensionary and retiral benefits on that basis.

The financial settlement was directed to be completed within three months from production of the judgment.

The writ petition was allowed without costs.