An exclusive jurisdiction clause can establish that the designated arbitration venue is not the juridical seat.

The Petitioner procured 696 MT of Sona Masuri/RNR paddy under a Supply Agreement dated 6 February 2024 with Respondent No. 2. Pending payment and lifting, the paddy was stored at Varasiddi Vinayaka Godown.

The Petitioner subsequently engaged Respondent No. 1 under a Warehouse Management Agreement dated 20 February 2024 for management and custody of the cargo.

The arbitration clause provided that arbitration proceedings “shall be held in Delhi,” while Clause 11 of the Warehouse Management Agreement subjected legal actions and proceedings, including applications for equitable relief and injunctions, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent courts in Jaipur.

The Petitioner filed the present petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking appointment of a Receiver/Local Commissioner, with police assistance, to secure and take custody of the cargo.

On 29 July 2026, the Court granted interim protection restraining the Respondents from dealing with or creating third-party rights in the cargo, but subsequently directed the Petitioner to address the Court’s jurisdiction.

1. Whether the designation of Delhi as the place where arbitration proceedings “shall be held” constituted the juridical seat of arbitration and conferred exclusive supervisory jurisdiction on the Delhi courts.

2. Whether the exclusive jurisdiction clause conferring jurisdiction on the competent courts at Jaipur displaced or qualified the inference that Delhi was the seat of arbitration.

3. Whether the present Section 9 petition was maintainable before the Delhi High Court.

The Court applied Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, concerning interim measures by a court, together with the seat-centric doctrine of arbitral jurisdiction.

It relied on BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC, (2020) 4 SCC 234, and M/s Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. M/s Micromax Informatics FZE, 2024 INSC 850, for the principle that the determination of the arbitral seat ordinarily confers exclusive supervisory jurisdiction on the courts of that seat, and that a place described as the “venue” may constitute the seat where there are no significant contrary indicia.

The Court also relied on Delhi Airport Metro Express Private Limited (India) v. Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles & Anr., 2025:DHC:11887-DB, which held that the parties’ intention must be ascertained from the agreement as a whole, including the arbitration, governing-law and exclusive-jurisdiction clauses; a venue is merely the physical location for hearings unless the agreement indicates a juridical seat.

The Court further noted the principle from State of West Bengal v. Associated Contractors, (2015) 1 SCC 32, concerning the jurisdictional consequences under Section 42, although the petition was ultimately decided on the contractual jurisdiction clause.

The Court accepted that the seat of arbitration ordinarily determines the exclusive supervisory court, and that the use of the word “venue” is not conclusive.

However, it held that the arbitration clause referring to Delhi had to be read together with Clause 11, which expressly provided that the parties irrevocably submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent courts in Jaipur for legal proceedings and equitable relief, including temporary or permanent injunctions.

This express Jaipur clause constituted a strong contrary indication that Delhi was intended only as the physical venue for arbitral proceedings and not as the juridical seat.

Consequently, the mere reference to Delhi as the place where arbitration would be held did not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi courts to entertain the Section 9 petition.

The present Section 9 petition was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction, with liberty to the Petitioner to approach the appropriate forum.