An Executive Engineer may initiate Section 95A proceedings when authorized by the MHADA Board.

The petitions concerned redevelopment of Issa Building, Byculla, under Regulation 33(7) of the DCPR 2034.

The building comprised 83 residential and non-residential units; about 57 occupants had surrendered possession and executed Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (PAAAs), while a minority remained in occupation.

The remaining occupants challenged proceedings under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (MHADA Act), including eviction notices dated 12 August 2026.

They alleged that the developers had not complied with conditions of the MHADA No Objection Certificate (NOC), and that the Executive Engineer lacked jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings.

MHADA maintained that the Chief Officer had authorized the Executive Engineer to act under Section 95A, and that the NOC conditions applied at different stages of redevelopment.

1. Whether proceedings under Section 95A initiated by the Executive Engineer were without jurisdiction or contrary to the scheme of the MHADA Act.

2. Whether alleged non-compliance with NOC conditions rendered the Section 95A proceedings premature or illegal.

Section 95A of the MHADA Act provides a summary mechanism for eviction where the statutory prerequisites for redevelopment are met and an occupant refuses to vacate; it is not a forum for full adjudication of redevelopment disputes.

Sections 16 and 18 establish an administrative structure through which the Board performs its statutory functions, including through its Chief Officer; Section 181 concerns delegation of powers exercisable by the Authority and does not make every Board function performed by an officer a delegation requiring separate statutory authorization.

The Court applied Radhika George v. MHADA, which limits Section 95A proceedings to their summary purpose; Sayed Anwar Gafoor v. Administrator and Divisional Commissioner, on the exercise of statutory functions through authorized officers; and Vasant Kheraj Bhanushali v. Goregaon Siddharth Nagar Sahakari Grih Nirman Sanstha Ltd., on the binding effect of redevelopment consent once given.

It distinguished Sahni Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, Javed Abdul Rahim Attar v. MHADA and Jugraj Tejraj and Sons v. Executive Engineer, as not establishing that the Executive Engineer lacked authority in these Section 95A proceedings.

The Court held that the Chief Officer was part of the Board’s statutory administrative machinery and that the Executive Engineer acted under the Board’s 14 September 2022 administrative order and the Chief Officer’s specific order of 1 July 2026; neither order had been challenged.

The Court therefore rejected the argument that Section 181 barred the Executive Engineer from acting.

On the NOC issue, it accepted the authorities’ evidence that transit rent and corpus had been offered or deposited where occupants had not accepted them, that the 10% rehabilitation construction-cost deposit was due before demolition, and that PAAAs were to be submitted before the later plinth-level commencement-certificate stage.

It found no present breach warranting invalidation of the Section 95A action and stated that disputes over later-stage obligations did not justify stalling redevelopment.

It dismissed all the writ petitions, discharged the rule and made no order as to costs; it also expected MHADA to enforce the NOC conditions and act on any established breach in accordance with law.