An Ombudsman’s unreasoned tariff determination is unsustainable and must be remanded for fresh consideration.

The petitioners challenged an order dated 13 November 2025 passed by the Electricity Ombudsman under Section 42(6) of the Electricity Act, 2003, arising from an order dated 4 March 2025 of the Regional Grievance Redressal Officer (“RGRO”).

The petitioners, an educational institution, alleged that WBSEDCL had raised inflated electricity bills and disconnected their supply on 1 December 2024 for non-payment of those bills.

The RGRO held that Petitioner No. 1 was liable to pay the outstanding dues.

The Ombudsman thereafter held that, since the petitioner had a connected/demand load of 88 KVA, it was not entitled to the D-4 tariff category, while permitting it to reduce its load below 50 KVA to obtain that tariff benefit.

The petitioners approached the High Court contending that, as a private educational institution, they could not be treated as an ordinary commercial consumer merely because their load exceeded 50 KVA.

1. Whether the Ombudsman’s order denying the petitioner the benefit of the D-4 tariff category was legally sustainable when the petitioner was identified as a private educational institution and the order did not explain why it was subject to the tariff criteria applicable to commercial consumers having a load of 50 KVA or more.

2. Whether the Ombudsman’s order was liable to be set aside for failure to provide adequate reasons supporting its conclusion.

Section 42(6) of the Electricity Act, 2003 governs representations before the Electricity Ombudsman against orders of the grievance redressal authority.

Clause 10.5 of Regulation 56 of the West Bengal Electricity Regulatory Commission Regulations dated 26 August 2013 was relied upon for issuance of the Ombudsman’s final order.

The applicable tariff schedule distinguishes between “Private Educational Institutions and Hospitals” and “Commercial Consumers having connected load/demand load of 50 KVA and above”.

The Court applied the settled administrative-law principle that reasons are the “live links” between the factual findings and the judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative conclusion; an unreasoned order cannot withstand judicial scrutiny.

The Court found that the Ombudsman merely recorded the petitioner’s 88 KVA load and concluded that it was not entitled to the D-4 tariff, without explaining why an institution described by the Ombudsman itself as an “educational institute” should be governed by the tariff category applicable to commercial consumers.

Since the tariff schedule contained separate categories for private educational institutions and commercial consumers, the Ombudsman was required to explain whether, and on what legal basis, exceeding the 50 KVA threshold converted the petitioner into a commercial consumer or otherwise disentitled it to the D-4 tariff.

The absence of such reasoning rendered the order legally unsustainable, irrespective of the ultimate merits of the parties’ competing claims.

The Ombudsman was requested to decide the matter by passing a reasoned order within four weeks from communication of the judgment, particularly in view of the petitioners’ submission that their electricity supply had remained disconnected for a substantial period.

The Court expressly left all merits open for determination by the Ombudsman.

The petitioners were permitted to request WBSEDCL to restore supply upon part-payment or lump-sum payment with payment of the balance in instalments, but the Court clarified that WBSEDCL was not mandatorily directed to restore supply or grant instalments.

The writ petition was disposed of without costs.