An oral sale agreement can support interim injunction where parties’ conduct prima facie establishes consensus ad idem.

The appellant-plaintiff purchased several parcels of land for establishing an industrial park. It alleged that, pursuant to an oral agreement with respondent/defendant no. 1, the parties undertook reciprocal transfers of land, including the plaintiff’s conveyance of 65.640 decimals to defendant no. 1 and the defendant’s corresponding obligation to convey approximately 151.46 decimals to the plaintiff for an agreed consideration of ₹3,36,88,554.

Although the plaintiff claimed to have performed its reciprocal obligations, defendant no. 1 allegedly failed to execute the balance conveyance. The plaintiff consequently instituted Title Suit No. 187 of 2019 seeking specific performance, alternatively damages, and permanent injunctions concerning the suit property and the common passage providing ingress and egress.

The plaintiff also sought interim relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, restraining the defendants from changing the nature of the suit property, making construction, alienating it, obstructing the common passage, or interfering with the plaintiff’s ingress and egress.

The trial court rejected the injunction application, holding, inter alia, that there was insufficient documentary evidence of the oral agreement, that the common passage was not part of the suit property, and that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable injury.

1. Whether the suit was a “commercial dispute” under Section 2(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and was therefore required to be instituted before a Commercial Court rather than an ordinary civil court?

2. Whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable injury warranting temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC?

3. Whether the alleged oral agreement for transfer of immovable property was legally cognisable and raised a triable issue sufficient for interim protection?

The Court applied Section 2(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which defines a “commercial dispute”, including disputes concerning construction and infrastructure contracts and agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce.

It applied the settled principles governing temporary injunctions under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.

The Court held that an oral agreement is not barred by Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and that a suit for specific performance may be founded on such an agreement; its existence and terms are matters for trial where the pleadings and surrounding conduct disclose a triable issue.

It relied on Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi, (2009) 2 SCC 582, in support of the enforceability of an oral contract, while distinguishing Brij Mohan v. Sugar Begum, (1990) 4 SCC 147, Shivaji Yallappa Patil v. Ranajeet Appasaheb Patil, (2018) 16 SCC 725, and Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 410, on their facts and procedural context.

The Court also held that an alternative claim for damages does not, by itself, bar the grant of temporary injunction.

The Court first held that the suit was not a commercial dispute because its principal relief was specific performance of an alleged agreement for transfer of immovable property, while the development agreement relied upon by the plaintiff was with a third-party developer and did not concern the defendant’s property being used exclusively in trade or commerce.

On the injunction issue, the Court found that the pleadings, the reciprocal conveyances executed by the parties, the contemporaneous correspondence, and the alleged exchange-like arrangement disclosed a prima facie case and a triable issue regarding consensus ad idem and the existence of the oral agreement.

The trial court’s reliance on the absence of stamp duty for an oral agreement was held to be legally untenable, and the absence of the date and place of the oral agreement in the plaintiff’s letter was considered a matter requiring evidence at trial rather than a basis for rejecting interim relief.

The Court further held that the common passage was included within the scheduled suit property and that the trial court had incorrectly treated it as extraneous.

The plaintiff’s alternative prayer for damages did not defeat its claim for protection of the property and passage pending adjudication.

The defendants were also restrained from creating nuisance, parking vehicles, or otherwise obstructing the common passage. The interim order dated 7 April 2026 was confirmed and modified accordingly.

The trial court was requested to dispose of the suit preferably within one year without unnecessary adjournments; the connected applications were disposed of, with no order as to costs.