An order altering a criminal charge is an intermediate order, not barred from revision.

The petitioner was prosecuted pursuant to an FIR lodged by his wife alleging that, during pending matrimonial proceedings at Vijaypur, he abused and assaulted her within the court premises, causing injuries and damage to articles.

The police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 323, 294, 324, 427 and 509 read with Section 34 IPC, and the Trial Court framed corresponding charges.

After the prosecution evidence was concluded and the matter was fixed for final arguments, the Trial Court invoked Section 216 Cr.P.C. and altered the charge by substituting Section 325 IPC for Section 324 IPC.

The petitioner’s criminal revision against that order was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge on the ground that the order was interlocutory and therefore barred by Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

The petitioner consequently approached the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/Section 482 Cr.P.C., contending that the alteration of charge had serious consequences and that the revision was maintainable.

1. Whether an order of the Trial Court altering a charge under Section 216 Cr.P.C., particularly at the stage of final arguments, is a purely interlocutory order attracting the bar under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.

2. Whether the Revisional Court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s revision as not maintainable without examining whether the impugned order was an intermediate order.

3. Whether the High Court should itself adjudicate the legality of substituting Section 325 IPC for Section 324 IPC, or remand the matter for consideration by the Revisional Court on merits.

The Court considered Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., which bars revisional interference against purely interlocutory orders, and Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 BNSS concerning the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

It also considered Section 216 Cr.P.C., which empowers a criminal court to alter or add to a charge before judgment.

Relying on Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137, the Court stated that a purely interlocutory order is interim or temporary and does not decide or affect important rights or liabilities.

Under Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, an order may be non-final yet still constitute an intermediate order against which revision is maintainable.

The relevant test is whether the order affects the accused’s rights or decides an important aspect of the trial.

The Trial Court’s order was passed after completion of the prosecution evidence and at the stage of final arguments, altering the charge from Section 324 IPC to the more serious offence under Section 325 IPC.

Such an alteration directly affected the petitioner’s substantive defence and exposed him to materially different criminal liability.

Applying the distinction between purely interlocutory and intermediate orders laid down in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye, the High Court held that the order had serious consequences for the petitioner’s rights and the continuation of the proceedings and therefore could not be treated as a purely interlocutory order.

The Revisional Court consequently committed a jurisdictional error by rejecting the revision solely on the ground of non-maintainability, without examining the character and effect of the Trial Court’s order.

The High Court did not determine whether Section 325 IPC was substantively made out, despite the petitioner’s arguments regarding the absence of medical evidence of grievous hurt.

Exercising its inherent jurisdiction, the Court set aside the Revisional Court’s approach and remanded the matter to the Revisional Court to decide the petitioner’s criminal revision afresh on merits in accordance with law.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the alteration of charge or on the merits of the criminal case.