Anticipatory bail may be denied where prima facie conspiracy and continued abscondence are shown.

The petitioner, Pudur Arun Kumar, was arrayed as Accused No. 14 in Crime No. 231 of 2024 registered at Chaderghat Police Station for offences under Sections 147, 148, 302, 109, 120-B, 212 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 25(1B)(A) of the Arms Act, 1959.

The prosecution alleged that Syed Najaf Ali was murdered near Malakpet Metro Station during the night of 28–29 June 2024 following an earlier financial dispute and threats involving certain accused persons.

The petitioner claimed that he was merely the driver of Accused Nos. 12 and 13 and had no specific overt act, direct evidence, or telephonic or financial link connecting him with the murder or conspiracy.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner advised Accused Nos. 3 and 12 regarding the murder and facilitated the payment of ₹10 lakhs for its execution.

It further alleged that the petitioner had remained absconding and that a charge sheet had been filed, with the case pending as S.C. No. 554 of 2025 before the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad.

The petitioner therefore sought anticipatory bail under Section 482 BNSS.

The Court applied Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, governing anticipatory bail, and considered the gravity and nature of the accusation, the specific role attributed to the accused, the investigation material, and the likelihood of evasion of the judicial process.

It relied on Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, for the principles governing anticipatory bail.

In relation to conspiracy under Sections 120-A and 120-B IPC, the Court applied the principle that conspiracy may be proved through circumstantial evidence, but mere association, knowledge, or participation in discussions is insufficient unless the circumstances prima facie indicate a meeting of minds and an agreement to commit an illegal act; this principle was drawn from Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394.

The Court further held that parity is not automatic and depends upon the individual role and material against each accused.

A co-accused’s confession to police cannot ordinarily constitute substantive evidence against another accused and must be assessed subject to statutory limitations and alongside independent incriminating material.

The Court held that the prosecution case against the petitioner was not limited to his association with Accused Nos. 12 and 13 as their driver. It attributed to him a specific role in advising the alleged perpetrators and facilitating the payment of ₹10 lakhs for the murder.

Although the petitioner was not alleged to have physically assaulted the deceased, the Court held that physical participation was not essential where a prima facie conspiratorial or facilitative role was alleged.

At the anticipatory-bail stage, the Court was not required to conduct a mini-trial or finally assess the credibility of witnesses; the alleged omissions, improvements, and evidentiary weaknesses were matters for trial.

The alleged advice, financial arrangement, witness statements, subsequent cooperation among the accused, and surrounding circumstances were considered cumulatively sufficient to disclose a prima facie link between the petitioner and the conspiracy.

The petitioner’s alleged abscondence was also treated as a relevant circumstance indicating a possible likelihood of evading the judicial process, although the Court clarified that abscondence by itself was not proof of guilt.

The plea of parity failed because relief granted to co-accused persons could not be mechanically extended without comparing their respective roles and the material against them.

The material collected during investigation prima facie indicated his involvement in the alleged conspiracy and facilitation of the murder, while his alleged continued unavailability raised a reasonable apprehension that he might evade the judicial process.

Accordingly, the Criminal Petition was dismissed.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to the anticipatory-bail application and would not affect the merits of the trial.

The petitioner was left at liberty to surrender before the jurisdictional Trial Court and seek regular bail, which was to be considered independently and uninfluenced by the observations in the order.