Anticipatory bail once granted cannot be cancelled without cogent evidence of supervening circumstances or misuse of liberty.

The applicant (complainant/wife) filed a petition under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. seeking the cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to Respondent No. 2 (husband) by the 20th Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, on 19.04.2022

Respondent No. 2 is an accused in Crime No. 218/2022 involving offences under Sections 377, 498A, and 506 of the IPC, and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

The applicant alleged that the respondent was misusing judicial power, pressuring her to compromise, and that there was a possibility of evidence tampering

Respondent No. 2 contended that the case arises from a matrimonial dispute already pending before a Family Court and that no bail conditions were violated

1. Whether the applicant established "cogent and overwhelming circumstances" or "supervening events" sufficient to warrant the cancellation of anticipatory bail under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C.

The court applied the principles governing the cancellation of bail as established in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349, which mandates that bail should not be cancelled mechanically unless there is interference with justice, evasion of law, or abuse of liberty

It further relied on CBI v. Subramani Gopalakrishnan (2011) 5 SCC 296, emphasizing the distinction between the criteria for granting bail and cancelling it

Bhuri Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022 SCC Online), which holds that cancellation powers must be exercised with extreme circumspection and not as disciplinary proceedings

Reference was also made to Himanshu Sharma v. State of M.P. (2024) 4 SCC 222

The court reasoned that the trial court granted anticipatory bail after due consideration of the material on record and the matrimonial nature of the dispute

Applying the Dolat Ram standard, the Court found no evidence that the respondent had violated any bail conditions or committed any "supervening" act that would render a fair trial impossible if he remained free

The Court noted that the allegations regarding pressure for compromise and potential tampering were not substantiated by any material evidence

It concluded that the original bail order was neither perverse nor against settled legal norms, and therefore, judicial interference was not justified

The petition was dismissed, affirming that the liberty of the accused did not counteract the requirements of a proper trial