Anticipatory bail remains barred under the SC/ST Act where the FIR prima facie discloses its offence ingredients.

The applicant sought anticipatory bail in FIR No. 0007/2026, Police Station Laxmi Nagar, registered under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“SC/ST Act”) and Section 506 IPC.

The complainant, who belongs to a Scheduled Caste, alleged that he had entered into a gym partnership with the applicant in October 2023.

On 23 March 2024, the applicant and another person allegedly assaulted him and used caste-based slurs in the presence of others.

After dissolution of the partnership, the applicant allegedly continued to insult him with casteist expressions, threatened him through telephone calls and intermediaries, and, on 15 July 2024, threatened to kill him while using caste-based abuse.

The complainant first approached the police and the National Commission for Scheduled Castes on 30 June 2025; the FIR was ultimately registered on 6 January 2026.

The applicant contended that the FIR was delayed and retaliatory, particularly because the applicant and his wife had caused two FIRs to be registered against the complainant on 17 December 2025.

The complainant’s statement under Section 183 BNSS and statements of two alleged eyewitnesses under Section 180 BNSS supported the prosecution version.

The applicant had failed to join investigation pursuant to three notices under Section 35(3) BNSS, although he joined investigation after obtaining interim protection from the Sessions Court; his anticipatory-bail application was later dismissed.

Whether the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclosed offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, thereby attracting the statutory bar against anticipatory bail under Sections 18 and 18-A(2) of the Act.

Whether, notwithstanding the statutory bar, the High Court could grant anticipatory bail in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the prosecution was motivated by private vendetta.

Whether the alleged delay and the applicant’s claim that the FIR was retaliatory constituted an exceptional case warranting pre-arrest protection.

The Court applied Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which criminalise intentional insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate, and abuse by caste name, respectively, when committed against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in a place within public view.

Sections 18 and 18-A(2) of the SC/ST Act bar the application of anticipatory-bail jurisdiction under Section 438 CrPC—corresponding, as stated in the judgment, to Section 482 BNSS—where the complaint or FIR prima facie discloses an offence under the Act.

Relying on Prithvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 727, the Court held that pre-arrest bail may be considered only where no prima facie case under the SC/ST Act is made out, and that such power must be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases.

Relying on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2249, the Court held that the test is whether, on a prima facie reading of the FIR or complaint, the necessary ingredients of the offence are disclosed; allegations of political or private vendetta may be examined by the High Court under its inherent or constitutional jurisdiction, but not through ordinary anticipatory-bail jurisdiction once a prima facie offence is disclosed.

The Court found that the FIR contained specific allegations that the applicant had used caste-based slurs against the complainant in the presence of other persons, including at the gym and during a telephone conversation heard by others, and had also threatened him.

These allegations, taken at face value, disclosed the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s), including caste-based insult or abuse and the requirement that it occur within public view.

Consequently, Sections 18 and 18-A(2) barred anticipatory bail under the ordinary statutory provision.

Although the Court accepted that it retained jurisdiction to consider a plea of malicious prosecution or private vendetta under Section 528 BNSS or Article 226, it held that the present case was not exceptional.

The complainant had made an earlier police complaint and approached the National Commission for Scheduled Castes before the formal FIR was registered; his allegations were supported by his statement and those of two eyewitnesses.

Therefore, the subsequent registration of FIRs at the instance of the applicant and his wife, and the timing of the present FIR, were insufficient by themselves to establish private vendetta.

The Court expressly left open the broader question whether anticipatory bail could ever be granted for SC/ST Act offences through Section 528 BNSS or Article 226.

Accordingly, the statutory bar under Sections 18 and 18-A(2) applied, and the applicant failed to establish an exceptional case of malicious or retaliatory prosecution warranting exercise of the High Court’s inherent or constitutional jurisdiction.

The anticipatory-bail application and pending application were dismissed.

The Court clarified that its observations were confined to adjudication of the bail application and would not prejudice the merits of the criminal proceedings or the connected FIRs.