Appeal under Section 19, Contempt of Courts Act lies only against orders inflicting punishment.

The Appellant, acting as a Bankruptcy Trustee, filed an application [IA (IBC) No 951 / 2025] seeking directions against the Respondent to furnish a statement of financial position as mandated under Section 129 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC)

On June 23, 2025, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) directed the Respondent to cooperate and provide the necessary documents

Alleging non-compliance with this order, the Appellant filed a Contempt Petition [Contempt Application (IBC) / 19 / 2025] invoking Section 425 of the Companies Act, 2013, and Sections 10 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

The NCLT rejected the Contempt Petition on January 20, 2026, finding no deliberate violation of its orders

The Appellant subsequently challenged this dismissal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).

1. Whether an appeal is maintainable against an order of the Tribunal dismissing a Contempt Petition where no punishment has been inflicted?

2. Whether the applicant who initiates contempt proceedings has the locus standi to file an appeal against the dismissal of such proceedings under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?

Section 425 of the Companies Act, 2013, which clarifies that the Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal possess the same jurisdiction and authority regarding contempt as a High Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, which provides for an appeal only against orders where punishment for contempt has been inflicted

the settled legal principle that an applicant in contempt proceedings acts merely as an "informer" to the court to protect the court's dignity, rather than as a traditional litigant with a continuing role after the petition is filed

The Appellate Tribunal reasoned that because Section 425 of the Companies Act mandates that contempt proceedings be governed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the right to appeal is strictly limited by Section 19 of the 1971 Act

The Tribunal observed that Section 19(1) only envisages appeals against orders that actually impose punishment

In the present case, the NCLT had exercised its "exclusive prerogative" to dismiss the petition after finding no deliberate violation

The NCLAT emphasized that while a "contemnor" has the right to appeal a punishment, the "informer" (the original applicant) has no statutory right to appeal a dismissal of contempt proceedings

Therefore, since no punishment was awarded by the NCLT, the appeal was held to be legally barred

The appeal was dismissed

the Appellate Tribunal noted the responsibility of the NCLT to ensure its orders are complied with to maintain the sanctity of judicial proceedings and requested the lower Tribunal to proceed accordingly to ensure compliance with the original directions