Appeals concerning service taxability are not maintainable under Section 35G; remedy lies under Section 35L.

The Revenue (Appellant) filed an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, challenging a CESTAT order dated September 16, 2025.

The CESTAT had ruled that the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (Respondent) was not liable to pay service tax on "Registration and Labelling Fees" and "Processing Fees," categorizing these as statutory performances rather than taxable "Technical Inspection and Certification Services."

The Revenue argued that the Respondent is not a government entity and that recent statutory amendments removed their tax protection.

The Respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal before the High Court.

Whether an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, is maintainable before the High Court when the core issue relates to the taxability of a service.

The court applied Section 35G and Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Section 35G excludes the High Court's jurisdiction in matters relating to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or the value of goods for purposes of assessment.

The Court relied on its own Division Bench precedents in *Commissioner of Service Tax Delhi v. M/S Konark Exim Pvt. Ltd.* (2025:DHC:7829:DB) and *Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise Delhi South v. Spicejet Ltd.* (SERTA 2/2024), which established that issues concerning taxability must be appealed exclusively to the Supreme Court.

The Court examined the nature of the dispute and found that the CESTAT’s findings directly addressed whether the Respondent's activities constituted a taxable service.

Following the established precedent in *Konark Exim Pvt. Ltd.* and *Spicejet Ltd.*, the Court reasoned that since the controversy involves the "taxability" of services, it falls within the category of cases where the statutory remedy lies solely with the Supreme Court under Section 35L, rather than the High Court under Section 35G.

The Court declined to entertain the Revenue's arguments on the merits regarding the Respondent's status or statutory amendments, noting that the threshold jurisdictional bar rendered the appeal non-maintainable.

The appeal was disposed of with liberty granted to the Appellant to approach the Supreme Court under Section 35L.

The Court further clarified that the time spent prosecuting this appeal may be considered by the Apex Court for the purpose of condonation of delay.