Appeals in the corporate debtor’s name post-IRP appointment are incompetent and incurable beyond the limitation period.

The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitted a Section 9 application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) against the Corporate Debtor (CD), Ambro Asia Private Limited, on 18.04.2024

Piyush Moona was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP)

On 24.04.2024, the appellant (a suspended director) filed an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) in the name of the CD, verified by himself

On 12.08.2025, the NCLAT noted the appeal was maintainable only if filed by the director in his own name, as management had vested in the IRP

Despite this, the NCLAT permitted the appellant to amend the memo of appeal in August 2025 to prosecute it in his personal capacity

The NCLAT subsequently dismissed the appeal on merits on 07.01.2026

Section 16 and Section 17(1)(a) of the IBC, which mandate that from the date of appointment of the IRP, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor vests in the IRP

Section 61(2) of the IBC, which prescribes a strict limitation period of 30 days for filing appeals, condonable by only 15 additional days, leaving no discretion for further extensions

The Court distinguished procedural irregularities discussed in Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, which allow for the correction of "curable" defects.

The Court reasoned that once the IRP was appointed on 18.04.2024, the suspended director lost the authority to represent or file legal proceedings in the name of the CD

Consequently, the appeal filed on 24.04.2024 was not merely "defective" in procedure but "wholly incompetent" at its inception

The Court observed that while procedural defects like a missing signature or misdescription of parties can be rectified, a lack of standing or authority cannot be "cured" after the limitation period has expired

By permitting the amendment in August 2025—well beyond the 45-day maximum window allowed under Section 61(2)—the NCLAT "desecrated" the statutory mandate of the Code

The Court emphasized that time-bound mandates under the IBC are sacrosanct and cannot be bypassed through procedural amendments that effectively entertain time-barred appeals

The NCLAT erred in permitting the amendment and adjudicating the matter on merits

Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds of maintainability and incompetence without entering into the merits of the NCLT’s admission order