Appeals under the Gratuity Act cannot be entertained beyond the statutory 120-day limit.

Twenty-nine persons jointly sought gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.

The Controlling Authority issued orders on 12 and 18 December 2024.

The petitioner filed one composite appeal against all 29 orders on 12 March 2025.

The Appellate Authority returned it on 10 October 2025, directing the petitioner to file separate appeals with certified copies and valid bank drafts.

The petitioner filed separate appeals on 31 October 2025; the Appellate Authority dismissed them as time-barred on 23 June 2026.

The petitioner challenged that dismissal and the Controlling Authority’s orders by writ petitions.

1. Whether the Appellate Authority could condone delay in an appeal under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act beyond the statutory maximum of 120 days from receipt of the Controlling Authority’s order.

2. Whether filing a single composite appeal against 29 separate orders within 120 days preserved limitation for the separate appeals filed after the composite appeal was returned.

Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 permits an appeal within 60 days of receipt of the order and allows the appellate authority, upon sufficient cause, to extend that period by a further 60 days; the statutory maximum is therefore 120 days, beyond which delay cannot be condoned.

The Court relied on Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, which held that where a statute specifies a further, capped period for filing an appeal, the outer limit is mandatory and the appeal cannot be entertained after it.

Section 7(4)(b) permits joint applications to the Controlling Authority, but Section 7(7) requires a separate appeal against each order.

The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to proceedings under the Payment of Gratuity Act.

Although the composite appeal was filed within 120 days, it challenged 29 separate orders and was not entertained as a valid appeal under Section 7(7).

The separate appeals were filed only on 31 October 2025, well beyond the statutory period.

The petitioner’s reliance on the return of the composite appeal did not overcome the limitation bar; moreover, the separate appeal memorandum did not explain the delay or refer to the composite filing and its return.

The Appellate Authority therefore lacked power to condone the delay beyond the statutory maximum.

It dismissed the writ petitions and declined to interfere with the challenged orders.