Appellate court not mandated to aid defendants collecting defence evidence easily accessible during trial.

The petitioner was convicted of an offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and sentenced on 18.08.2025 to three months Simple Imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 24 lakhs as compensation to the complainant

The petitioner appealed this order (Criminal Appeal No. 346/2025) and simultaneously filed an application under Section 391 Cr.P.C. seeking permission to lead additional evidence, specifically the respondent's bank account statements, asserting their vitality regarding the existence of "legally enforceable debt"

This application was dismissed by the First Appellate Court on 17.02.2026, which is now under challenge

The original complaint, filed in 2022, alleged an outstanding amount of Rs. 19,85,692/-, acknowledged by the accused in 2021

The accused allegedly issued five cheques totaling Rs. 20 lakhs, which were dishonored due to "funds insufficient"

The petitioner claimed through the application that the complainant withheld material bank statements and that an alleged payment of Rs. 1 lakh and Rs. 35,000/- via Paytm was never reflected in the complainant's ledger statement, which also lacked a Section 65B Indian Evidence Act certificate

The petitioner acknowledged being aware of these payments from the beginning, having made them personally, but did not cross-examine the complainant's witness regarding them on 23.11.2024, nor did he enter the witness box during his own defence to highlight these payments

Whether the First Appellate Court erred in dismissing the petitioner's application under Section 391 Cr.P.C. to lead additional evidence regarding bank account statements and alleged payments

The court applied Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, concerning the power of an appellate court to take further evidence

The court also relied on the Supreme Court's observation in *Ajitsin Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2024) 4 SCC 453*, which clarified that power under Section 391 Cr.P.C. should be exercised only when the appellant was prevented from presenting evidence at trial despite due diligence or when facts emerged later, and non-recording would lead to a failure of justice

The court also implicitly acknowledged Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the admissibility of electronic records

The court reasoned that the petitioner was in possession of the information regarding the alleged payments of Rs. 1,35,000/- as early as 2022, and thus, this evidence was within his knowledge and control from the outset

The court observed that the petitioner failed to confront the complainant's witness with these payments during cross-examination on 23.11.2024, and inexplicably did not enter the witness box himself to lead evidence on this matter after recording his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.

Applying the principles from *Ajitsin Chehuji Rathod*, the court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated that he was prevented from presenting this evidence earlier despite due diligence, nor that the facts came to light later.

Therefore, the application to lead additional evidence was considered a belated endeavor due to the petitioner's own inaction

The court also dismissed the argument that a litigant should not suffer due to counsel's inaction, stating it would not advance the applicant's case

The court noted that arguments regarding security cheques or the inadmissibility of the ledger statement for lack of a Section 65B certificate could still be raised during the main appeal

The petition was disposed of in these terms, and pending applications also stood disposed of

The Court clarified that its observations were solely for the disposal of the petition and would not prejudice the mind of the learned First Appellate Court during the main appeal