Appellate courts cannot overturn acquittal where the trial court’s view is possible and plausible.

On 12 January 2008, Vivek Chhabra visited the Indo-Chin Bar, Lado Sarai, with friends.

After the bar closed, an altercation occurred in the parking area involving Surinder Singh, who was sitting in a car owned by Mayank Lakhani.

According to Chhabra, Singh fired a pistol first in the air and then at his leg.

A police investigation followed the recording of Chhabra’s statement and registration of FIR No. 39/2008 under Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act.

Singh was arrested, and a pistol, five live cartridges, and its licence were seized.

The prosecution examined 16 witnesses.

Of the six cited eyewitnesses, only Nand Kishore, Vivek Chhabra, and Mayank Lakhani claimed to have witnessed the incident; the remaining public witnesses did not support the prosecution’s version.

The Trial Court found material contradictions in the eyewitness testimony and acquitted Singh of the offences under Sections 307 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act on 3 October 2011.

The State preferred the present appeal against acquittal.

Whether the Trial Court’s acquittal of the respondent under Section 307 IPC was sustainable despite the complainant’s allegation that the respondent intentionally fired at his leg?

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent used his licensed firearm in contravention of the Arms Act so as to attract Section 27 of the Arms Act?

Whether the appellate court, in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC, could interfere with the Trial Court’s view merely because another view of the evidence was possible?

The Court considered Section 378 CrPC governing appeals against acquittal, and Sections 307 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act, which require proof of the requisite intent and of the accused’s unlawful use of the firearm, respectively.

Relying on H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Court reiterated that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence; an appellate court may reappreciate the evidence but cannot reverse an acquittal if the Trial Court’s view is a possible and plausible one.

Interference is justified only where the evidence admits of the sole conclusion that guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court also noted the Trial Court’s advantage in observing witness demeanour while recording testimony.

The Court held that the prosecution evidence disclosed two materially inconsistent accounts.

Chhabra alleged that Singh deliberately fired at him, whereas independent eyewitness Nand Kishore stated that the pistol was snatched from Singh during a scuffle and that the shot was fired during the ensuing struggle.

Lakhani’s testimony was closer to Nand Kishore’s version, as he stated that Chhabra was grappling with Singh and that Singh was attempting to recover the pistol.

The other public witnesses did not witness the shooting and did not support the prosecution case.

The medical evidence also did not conclusively establish an injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature; the injury was below the knee and the doctor ultimately accepted that the injury in the present case could not itself have caused death.

Since the evidence did not reliably establish that Singh fired the shot causing Chhabra’s injury, the prosecution failed to prove the ingredients of Section 307 IPC beyond reasonable doubt.

For the same reason, it could not prove that Singh used the firearm in contravention of the Arms Act, notwithstanding the seizure of the licensed pistol.

The Trial Court’s view was therefore a possible and plausible view, attracting the restriction on appellate interference in an appeal against acquittal.

It held that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Surinder Singh intentionally fired at Vivek Chhabra or that he used the firearm in contravention of the Arms Act.

The Trial Court’s acquittal under Sections 307 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act was found to be neither perverse nor legally unsustainable.

Accordingly, the State’s appeal was dismissed, and the respondent’s acquittal was affirmed.