Appellate courts cannot reverse acquittal where the trial court’s view is a possible one.

On 7 February 2008, a police party allegedly apprehended Bhawan Sood near Sheetla Mata Temple, Kullu, while he was carrying a polythene bag.

A search allegedly resulted in the recovery of 12.750 grams of heroin, along with other articles.

Two independent witnesses were stated to have been associated with the search and seizure, and samples were drawn, sealed with seal “T”, and subsequently re-sealed with seal “H” at the police station under Section 55 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”).

The forensic report identified the substance as smack/heroin.

After investigation, the accused was prosecuted under Section 21 of the NDPS Act and was acquitted by the Special Judge-II, Kullu, on 8 January 2015.

The State preferred an appeal against the acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”).

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that 12.750 grams of heroin was recovered from the conscious and exclusive possession of the accused, thereby establishing an offence under Section 21 of the NDPS Act?

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse or unreasonable so as to warrant appellate interference in an appeal against acquittal?

Whether the contradictions in the evidence of the official witnesses, the denial by the independent witnesses, and the absence of a resealing certificate created reasonable doubt regarding the search, recovery and preservation of the case property?

The Court applied Section 21 of the NDPS Act, which penalises possession of manufactured drugs or preparations, and relied on the prosecution’s obligation to establish conscious possession beyond reasonable doubt.

Sections 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act were relevant to the preservation and reporting of the seized contraband.

In an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence but must respect the strengthened presumption of innocence and interfere only where the trial court’s view is perverse, legally erroneous, or not reasonably possible.

The Court relied on Muralidhar alias Gidda v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 730; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581; Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440; and Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433, for the principles governing appellate interference with acquittals.

The Court found that both independent witnesses completely denied witnessing the accused’s search, recovery or seizure proceedings.

Although the official witnesses supported the prosecution, their testimony contained material contradictions, particularly regarding the manner in which the police party returned to the spot after the rukka was sent: PW-3 stated that he returned on a motorcycle driven by Constable Bhim Sen, whereas the Investigating Officer expressly denied this circumstance.

The Court also noted the absence of a resealing certificate under Section 55 of the NDPS Act, despite the alleged resealing of the case property by the SHO.

These discrepancies created uncertainty about whether the independent witnesses were present when the accused was apprehended and whether the recovery was conducted in their presence.

Since the trial court’s view that the prosecution evidence was doubtful was a reasonably possible view, the appellate court held that it could not substitute its own view merely because another conclusion might also have been possible.

It held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that heroin had been recovered from the conscious and exclusive possession of the accused.

The trial court’s acquittal was neither perverse nor legally unsustainable and did not warrant appellate interference.

Accordingly, the State’s appeal was dismissed and the judgment of acquittal dated 8 January 2015 was affirmed.

The Court further directed furnishing of bail bonds of ₹25,000 with one surety under Section 437-A CrPC, effective for six months, subject to appearance before the Supreme Court if required in any further proceedings.