Appellate courts may disturb acquittals only for perversity leaving no reasonable alternative view.

The State challenged the trial court’s acquittal of Gajanand Sen of offences under Sections 376, 450 and 506 of the IPC.

The prosecution alleged that, on 12 March 2020, the respondent sexually assaulted the complainant while she was attending a marriage function and threatened her against disclosing the incident.

She reported the incident on 31 March 2020, after returning home and later informing her husband.

The trial court acquitted the respondent after assessing the testimony and other evidence; the State sought leave to appeal against that acquittal.

The High Court condoned a 31-day delay and considered the matter at the admission stage.

1. Whether the trial court’s assessment of the complainant’s testimony and the corroborative evidence was perverse so as to warrant interference with the acquittal

2. Whether the acquittal disclosed an error meeting the threshold for appellate interference and leave to appeal

The Court applied the principles in Santosh Prasad v. State of Bihar, 2020 (3) SCC 443, that a complainant’s testimony may sustain a conviction without corroboration if it is of sterling quality, but material inconsistencies or deficiencies may prevent reliance on it without supporting evidence.

It also relied on Nirmal Premkumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2024) 20 SCC 293, which states that where a witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, the court must assess the true genesis of the incident and may act on a victim’s testimony alone only where its quality and credibility are exceptionally high and it remains consistent in material respects.

Under Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 INSC 11410, interference with an acquittal is warranted only where the decision suffers from patent perversity, misreads or omits material evidence, and no two reasonable views are possible.

The prosecution had charged the respondent under Sections 376, 450 and 506 of the IPC.

The High Court considered the complainant’s evidence alongside her delay in disclosure, the evidence of her husband and sister-in-law, and the medical and forensic material.

It noted that she did not raise an alarm or otherwise resist during the alleged incident and did not disclose it for about 20 days, including to family members with whom she lived; her husband’s evidence was that he learned of the alleged relationship from others before questioning her.

The medical examination found no external injuries and gave no definite opinion on rape or intercourse; although human sperm was found on the victim’s slide, there was no matching report attributing it to the respondent.

On that record, the Court accepted the trial court’s view that the complainant’s testimony was not of sterling quality and that the evidence did not establish the respondent’s identity as the perpetrator.

It found no perversity or other basis meeting the threshold for appellate interference.

It declined to grant leave to appeal and dismissed the CRMP in limine, without notice to the respondent.