Appellate courts must exercise caution in overturning acquittals unless perverse or illegal.

The victim (PW-2) lodged a report against Anuj Uikey and Pranjal Sharma alleging abduction, rape, and offenses under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

The incident occurred on October 7, 2012, where Anuj Uikey allegedly forced the victim into his car, teased her, and committed rape.

The victim narrated the incident to her parents two days later, and an FIR was lodged on October 9, 2012.

During the investigation, the victim was medically examined, her clothes and date of birth certificate were seized, and the accused's clothes and a swift car were seized.

The birth certificate of the victim, confirming her ST status, was also seized.

After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against Anuj Uikey and Pranjal Sharma.

The trial court framed charges and heard 12 prosecution witnesses.

The accused denied the charges, claiming false implication.

On February 28, 2014, the trial court acquitted the respondents of offenses under Sections 363, 366, 366-A, and 376(2)(g) IPC, and Section 3(2)(5) of the Act of 1989.

However, Anuj Uikey was convicted under Section 376(1) IPC.

The State appealed the acquittal.

The trial court found that the victim was below 16 years old at the time of the incident and that the offense of rape against Anuj Uikey was proven based on the victim's testimony.

It found no evidence that the victim was taken away to be compelled into illicit sexual intercourse, or that Anuj Uikey committed the offense based on the victim's caste.

Regarding Pranjal Sharma, the trial court noted he neither touched the victim nor used force, and that the victim saw him at the police station before the Test Identification Parade (TIP), making identification doubtful.

A statement attributed to Pranjal Sharma by the victim was omitted from her police statement and written complaint, leading the trial court to conclude it was not conclusively proven.

Whether the trial court erred in acquitting the respondents of the charges leveled against them, particularly concerning the victim's age and the clear evidence of offense?

Whether the appellate court should interfere with the judgment of acquittal when the conclusions are based on a proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles of criminal jurisprudence, and no material evidence has been ignored or misappreciated?

The court applied Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, concerning appeals against acquittal.

It relied on precedents establishing the cautious approach required in appellate review of acquittals: *C. Antony v. Raghavan Nair* (AIR 2003 SC 182) and *Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha* (AIR 2004 SC 1053) which state that interference is warranted only if findings are perverse or relevant evidence is unjustifiably ignored.

*Tota Singh and another v. State of Punjab* (AIR 1987 SC 1083) further stipulates that interference is only justified if there is a manifest error, ignored material evidence, or a conclusion based on conjecture or misappreciation, and minor discrepancies do not override consistent testimony unless they go to the root of the case.

*State of Rajasthan Vs. Kistoora Ram* (2022 SCC OnLine SC 984) and *Jafarudheen and others v. State of Kerala* ((2022) 8 SCC 440) emphasize extreme caution, as an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence, and interference is warranted only if the trial court’s view is impossible or perverse, or if the appellate court finds the way of conviction to be more probable.

The court also referred to *State of Rajasthan v. Hemraj Others* (2009 AIR (SC) 2644) and *Vishwanath Others v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu* (2008 AIR (SC) 2222) which outline requirements for establishing gang rape under Section 376(2)(g) IPC, specifically requiring proof of common intention and overt acts.

The High Court, acting as an appellate court, reviewed the trial court's judgment of acquittal under the circumscribed powers of Section 378(1) CrPC.

It acknowledged the State's contention that the victim was below 16 and that Anuj Uikey committed rape without consent.

However, the court emphasized that the trial court, having observed witness demeanor, was in a superior position to assess credibility and that interference is only justified in exceptional cases where manifest error, ignored material evidence, or perverse conclusions are demonstrated.

The trial court's finding that the victim was acquainted with Anuj Uikey and had no prior enmity, lending credibility to her testimony regarding rape by Anuj Uikey, was noted.

The trial court explicitly found the offense of rape by Anuj Uikey proven based on the victim's testimony but acquitted him of other charges for lack of evidence of forced illicit intercourse or caste-based motive.

For Pranjal Sharma, the trial court’s reasoning for acquittal, based on the absence of physical contact or force by him, and critical omissions in the victim's statements regarding an incriminating remark and prior police station identification, was considered valid.

The High Court concurred with the trial court's application of precedents from *Hemraj* and *Vishwanath*, which require proof of common intention and overt acts for gang rape, finding a lack thereof against Pranjal Sharma.

Ultimately, the High Court found the trial court's conclusions to be based on a proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles, devoid of perversity or unreasonableness, and without ignoring or misappreciating material evidence.

No material evidence was shown to have been ignored or misappreciated to warrant interference.

Consequently, no ground was made out for granting leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal.

The acquittal appeal filed by the State under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. was dismissed at the admission stage itself, and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court was affirmed.