Appellate courts must not disturb a reasoned acquittal absent perversity or illegality.

The State challenged the judgment dated 18 July 2017 of the VII Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal, concerning an incident in which the prosecutrix alleged that, on 20 June 2014, the accused caught hold of her hand while she was going to a nearby shop.

The trial court acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 354 IPC, alternatively Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act.

The High Court’s order also records that the accused was convicted under Section 354-A(1)(i) and (ii) IPC, alternatively Sections 11(1)/12 of the POCSO Act, and sentenced to the period already undergone with a fine.

The State’s petition under Section 378(3) CrPC sought to set aside the acquittal, contending that the trial court had wrongly rejected the prosecutrix’s evidence.

1. Whether the trial court’s acquittal of the accused under Section 354 IPC, alternatively Sections 7/8 of the POCSO Act, was perverse or otherwise liable to be set aside.

2. Whether the State had shown sufficient grounds for the High Court to interfere with the acquittal under the principles governing appellate review of acquittals.

Section 378(3) CrPC governs an application for leave to appeal against acquittal.

In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court should first determine whether the acquittal is palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable; only if it is may the court reappraise the evidence.

Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 110, recognises the appellate court’s power to reconsider the evidence, while requiring it to respect the reinforced presumption of innocence and adopt a reasonable view favouring the accused.

Nikhil Chandra Mondal v. State of W.B., (2023) 6 SCC 605, reiterates that an acquittal should not be disturbed unless it is perverse, illegal or impossible, and that where two reasonable views are available, the acquittal should stand.

The High Court found that the prosecutrix had not stated in her Section 164 CrPC statement that the accused caught hold of her hand, and that the two independent witnesses did not support her on this material point and were declared hostile.

It accepted that the trial court had carefully assessed the evidence, identified the material weakness in the prosecution case and given cogent reasons for extending the benefit of doubt.

Applying the principles governing review of acquittals, the High Court found no illegality or perversity warranting interference.

It dismissed the petition.