Appellate courts must not disturb acquittals absent perversity, especially where two reasonable views of evidence exist.

The appellant–original complainant claimed rights over agricultural land bearing Revenue Survey No. 66, alleging that the respondents had created false documents and procured unauthorised mutation entries to dispossess him.

Following revenue proceedings, which allegedly resulted in an order favourable to the complainant, an FIR was registered alleging offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

The prosecution case was that, on 08.05.2013, the accused entered the agricultural land, abused and threatened the complainant and his family members, and insulted the complainant on the basis of his caste.

After investigation, charge-sheets were filed against the respondents for offences under Sections 447, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act.

The trial Court acquitted both accused in Special (Atrocity) Case Nos.15 of 2014 and 21 of 2016 by judgment dated 30.01.2017.

The complainant thereafter preferred the present appeals against acquittal under Section 378(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Whether the trial Court was justified in acquitting the respondents of the offences under Sections 447, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC and Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act?

Whether the trial Court had properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence on record?

Whether the impugned judgment of acquittal suffered from any illegality, irregularity or perversity warranting appellate interference?

The Court applied Sections 447, 504, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC, requiring proof respectively of criminal trespass, intentional insult with the requisite intention or knowledge, criminal intimidation, and abetment/common participation.

It also applied Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act, holding that caste-based insult must be proved to have occurred in a public place and within public view, with the requisite intention to insult the victim on the basis of caste.

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court possesses power to reappreciate the evidence, but the accused benefit from a double presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not ordinarily be disturbed.

These principles were drawn from Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149; and Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169.

For the Atrocities Act charge, the Court relied on Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, AIR 2024 SC 4557, and Gunjan @ Girija Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 (0) INSC 468, concerning the requirements of public place, public view, caste-based insult and intention.

The Court found that the complainant failed to establish that he was in ownership or possession of the disputed land at the relevant time.

The respondents relied on revenue records and an earlier oral sale transaction indicating their possession since 1969, while revenue and civil proceedings concerning title and possession were pending.

In the absence of proof of the complainant’s possession, the essential ingredient of criminal trespass under Section 447 IPC was not established.

The evidence of the complainant’s son contained material omissions and contradictions, and the investigating officer had not examined independent agriculturists allegedly present near the site.

Consequently, the allegations of intentional insult and criminal intimidation under Sections 504 and 506(2) IPC were not proved by cogent and reliable evidence.

The evidence was also insufficient to establish that the alleged caste-based abuse was uttered in a public place within public view, as required under Section 3(1)(10) of the Atrocities Act.

Applying the heightened restraint applicable to an appeal against acquittal, the Court held that the trial Court’s view was a reasonable one and was neither perverse nor manifestly illegal.

It found no illegality, perversity or infirmity in the trial Court’s acquittal and therefore dismissed both criminal appeals.

The judgment and order of acquittal dated 30.01.2017 were confirmed; the bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial Court.