Appellate courts should not disturb discretionary injunctions absent cogent grounds for interference.

The plaintiff sued for a permanent injunction concerning her possession and use of a parking space identified as “A” and a common area.

The trial court allowed her application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and restrained the defendant from dispossessing her from the disputed parking space and interfering with her possession and enjoyment of the scheduled property.

The defendant appealed under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC, arguing that her earlier sale deeds allotted parking spaces Nos. 2 and 3, while the plaintiff’s sale deed referred to a space marked “A,” creating uncertainty as to the spaces’ identification.

The suit, instituted in 2011, had proceeded to final arguments by the time the High Court considered the appeal in 2026.

1. Whether the trial court’s temporary injunction concerning the plaintiff’s use and possession of parking space “A” warranted appellate interference.

2. Whether the competing descriptions of the parties’ parking spaces in their respective sale deeds required determination by the trial court rather than resolution in the interlocutory appeal.

The appeal was brought under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC, which provides for an appeal from certain orders concerning temporary injunctions. The underlying application was under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, governing temporary injunctions.

The High Court treated the trial court’s injunction as a discretionary order and declined to interfere absent a good ground or cogent reason; it cited no precedent or further legal test.

The High Court noted that the parties’ competing claims depended on identifying parking space “A” in relation to spaces Nos. 2 and 3, a matter requiring consideration by the trial court during the proceedings.

It also recorded that the trial court had exercised its discretion to protect the plaintiff’s possession and that the parties did not dispute the stated measurements of their parking spaces.

Given the absence of a sufficient basis to disturb that discretionary order—and the suit’s advanced stage—the Court declined to intervene, leaving the merits to the trial court.

It stated that the trial court could impose exemplary costs for unnecessary adjournments and clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits.