Gujarat High Court
Criminal LawCriminal Procedure and Evidence

Appellate courts should not interfere with acquittals absent perversity or manifest illegality.

HARSHAD NANUBHAI DESAI vs MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD (TEXTILE DIVISION)

Gujarat High CourtJUDGMENT: August 18, 20263 MIN READSOURCE JUDGMENT
Appellate courts should not interfere with acquittals absent perversity or manifest illegality.. HARSHAD NANUBHAI DESAI vs MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD (TEXTILE DIVISION). Gujarat High Court. LawLens
THE ORIGINAL LAWLENS SUMMARY
01

Facts

The complainant–appellant filed a criminal complaint against Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and its representatives, alleging offences under Sections 106 and 107 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (“B.I.R. Act”).

Source reference: para. 2; p. 2

He alleged that, between 22 February 2000 and 4 June 2000, the workers were prevented from entering the mill without any application under Section 42(1) of the B.I.R. Act. He further alleged that the management required the workers to execute undertakings before resuming duty, contrary to the settlement dated 6 May 2000 under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and failed to pay the customary “Kharchi” amount on the 25th day of each month, allegedly violating Section 46 of the B.I.R. Act.

Source reference: para. 2; p. 2

The trial court recorded the plea, examined the complainant, and, after considering the oral and documentary evidence, acquitted the accused in Criminal Case No. 2 of 2001 by judgment dated 6 January 2011.

Source reference: paras. 2–4; pp. 1–3

The complainant challenged the acquittal under Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Source reference: para. 1; p. 1
02

Issues

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents committed offences under Sections 106 and 107 of the B.I.R. Act by preventing the complainant and other workers from entering or resuming work without executing undertakings.

Source reference: paras. 2.1, 5, 8; pp. 2–4

2. Whether the respondents violated the alleged settlement or established practice by failing to pay “Kharchi” on the 25th day of each month, thereby attracting liability under the B.I.R. Act.

Source reference: paras. 2.1, 5, 8; pp. 2–4

3. Whether the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378(4) CrPC, had sufficient ground to interfere with the trial court’s judgment.

Source reference: paras. 9–12; pp. 5–7
03

Law Applied

The appeal was governed by Section 378(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which permits an appeal against acquittal in a complaint case.

Source reference: para. 1; p. 1

The alleged substantive offences arose under Sections 106 and 107 of the B.I.R. Act, with the appellant also relying on Section 46 of that Act and a settlement allegedly made under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Source reference: para. 2.1; p. 2

The Court applied the settled rule that, although an appellate court may reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal, it should not interfere merely because another view is possible; interference is warranted where the trial court’s conclusion is perverse, manifestly illegal, or unavailable to a reasonable court. This principle was drawn from State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 75.

Source reference: para. 9; p. 5

This principle was drawn from State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh, 2007 AIR SCW 5553, and Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. State of M.P., 2007 AIR SCW 5589.

Source reference: para. 10; p. 6

The Court also relied on Mookkiah v. State, AIR 2013 SC 321, reaffirming that a High Court may review the entire evidence in an acquittal appeal but should reverse the acquittal only upon compelling assurance of guilt and not merely to adopt another possible view.

Source reference: para. 11; p. 6
04

Reasoning

The High Court found that the complainant failed to produce reliable proof of the alleged undertaking or settlement terms.

Source reference: para. 8; p. 4

In cross-examination, he admitted that the purported undertaking was a blank form without writing or signatures, and there was no adequate evidence connecting the accused with any unlawful undertaking imposed on the workers.

Source reference: para. 8; p. 4

The Court also held that the complainant did not establish the alleged settlement with him, lacked knowledge of the agreement executed by the Majur Mahajan, and failed to prove by cogent evidence that the “Kharchi” payment was contractually or legally due on the 25th of each month.

Source reference: para. 8; p. 4

The allegation that the offence was continuing or persistently committed was likewise unsupported by evidence.

Source reference: para. 8; p. 4

Applying the restricted standard applicable to an appeal against acquittal, the Court concluded that the trial court’s findings were reasonable and neither perverse nor legally erroneous.

Source reference: paras. 9–12; pp. 5–7
05

Holding

The High Court answered the issues against the complainant. It held that the alleged violations under Sections 106 and 107 of the B.I.R. Act were not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that no sufficient ground existed to disturb the acquittal.

The criminal appeal was dismissed, and the judgment and order dated 6 January 2011 passed by the Labour Court, Navsari, in Criminal Case No. 2 of 2001 were confirmed. Any bail bonds were cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the trial court.

Source reference: paras. 12–13; p. 7
06

Acts & Sections Cited

10 provisions across 4 statutes referred to in this judgment. Linked provisions open on LawLens.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731

Section 378

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 19464

Section 106Section 107Section 42Section 46

Industrial Disputes Act, 19472

Section 2Section 2

Indian Penal Code, 18603

Section 73Section 302Section 34
Gujarat High Court

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HARSHAD NANUBHAI DESAIvsMAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD (TEXTILE DIVISION)

Gujarat High Court · August 18, 2026

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