Appellate interference in an acquittal is impermissible when the trial court's view is reasonable and possible.

The State filed an application under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C. seeking leave to appeal against a judgment dated 29.08.2017 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Birsingpur Pali.

The prosecution alleged that on 30.01.2012, the respondent assaulted the complainant, Sevak Kumar Kol, with a bottle after a dispute regarding a damaged fence, leading to an FIR under Sections 294, 323, and 506 Part II of the IPC.

Following a trial, the Magistrate acquitted the respondent, finding that the prosecution failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration.

1. Whether the State demonstrated sufficient grounds to grant leave to appeal against the judgment of acquittal under Section 378(3) of the Cr.P.C.

2. Whether the trial court’s appreciation of evidence was perverse or reached an unreasonable conclusion warranting appellate interference.

The court applied Section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, concerning the grant of leave to appeal in cases of acquittal.

It relied on the established principle that the presumption of innocence is strengthened by a judgment of acquittal and that interference is only warranted if the findings are perverse, manifestly illegal, or suffer from a serious misreading of evidence.

The court further cited Tota Singh and Another v. State of Punjab (1987) 2 SCC 529, which holds that if two reasonable views are possible on the evidence, the appellate court must adopt the view favourable to the accused rather than substituting its own opinion.

The High Court scrutinized the trial record and determined that the Magistrate had systematically evaluated the oral and documentary evidence, recording specific reasons for disbelieving the prosecution’s version.

The court noted that the State’s arguments regarding medical corroboration and witness testimony did not render the trial court’s findings "impossible" or "unreasonable".

Applying the Tota Singh doctrine, the court reasoned that even if a different view of the evidence were possible, the existence of a reasonable view supporting the acquittal precludes appellate interference.

The court found no manifest illegality or perversity in the lower court's assessment of the contradictions within the prosecution's case.

Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, the proposed criminal appeal was rejected at the threshold, and the judgment of acquittal dated 29.08.2017 was upheld.