Appointment may be denied where prolonged non-joining reflects a selected candidate’s lack of reasonable diligence.

The petitioner applied for appointment to the post of Upper Division Assistant and furnished a permanent address in Jaunpur and a correspondence address in Lucknow.

The respondents sent the admit card, a document-verification communication, and the final-examination result to the Lucknow address.

The petitioner admittedly received the communication dated 8 June 2004 informing him that he had been successful in the final examination.

However, the appointment letter dated 24 November 2004 was initially sent to his permanent address in Jaunpur.

It was allegedly redirected after postal endorsements and ultimately received by a neighbour in Lucknow, who, according to the petitioner, handed it over to him only on 14 April 2006.

The petitioner applied for permission to join on 17 April 2006 and submitted explanations regarding the delay.

After seeking further clarification, the competent authority cancelled his appointment on 19 October 2006 for failure to join within the stipulated period.

The petitioner challenged the cancellation and sought appointment, seniority, and consequential service benefits.

Whether the cancellation of the petitioner’s appointment for failure to join within the prescribed time was arbitrary, procedurally unfair, or otherwise legally infirm under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner’s delayed receipt of the appointment letter, allegedly caused by its dispatch to the permanent address and subsequent postal irregularities, entitled him to appointment and consequential service benefits.

Whether the principle laid down in Purushottam v. Chairman, M.S.E.B. , (1999) 6 SCC 49, required restoration of the petitioner’s appointment.

The Court applied the principles governing judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, under which interference with an administrative decision is warranted where the decision is arbitrary, perverse, procedurally unfair, or otherwise legally unsustainable.

It further applied the principle that a selected candidate should not lose appointment because of an illegality attributable entirely to the employer, as recognised in Purushottam v. Chairman, M.S.E.B. , (1999) 6 SCC 49.

However, that protection does not relieve a candidate of the obligation to act with reasonable diligence, particularly where the candidate knows of his selection and fails to maintain contact with the appointing authority.

The Court found that the petitioner had been given an adequate opportunity to explain the delay: he submitted an application and affidavit, responded to specific queries raised by the authority, and his explanation was considered before the cancellation order was passed.

Although the appointment letter was not initially sent to the Lucknow correspondence address, it was sent to the permanent address furnished by the petitioner himself.

More importantly, the petitioner admittedly knew by 8 June 2004 that he had passed the final examination, yet remained silent until 17 April 2006 and produced no evidence of making any inquiry regarding his appointment.

He was residing and working in Hardoi but did not communicate that address to the respondents.

Consequently, the delay could not be attributed solely to the respondents.

The Court distinguished Purushottam , where the candidate’s exclusion resulted entirely from the employer’s erroneous decision and no lapse was attributable to him.

The authority’s conclusion that the petitioner’s explanation was insufficient was therefore neither arbitrary nor perverse.

The petitioner’s failure to inquire about his appointment for nearly two years, despite knowledge of his successful selection, disentitled him from relying solely on the alleged postal irregularities.

The principle in Purushottam was held inapplicable.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs; the claims for appointment, seniority, and consequential service benefits were also rejected.