Arms Act convictions cannot stand where unsealed weapons and unsupported seizures leave recovery unproved.

The petitioners were convicted under Sections 25(1-B)(a), 26 and 35 of the Arms Act for alleged recovery of firearms and ammunition from a jeep and its occupants.

The trial court imposed concurrent two-year terms of rigorous imprisonment and fines; the appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In revision, the petitioners challenged, among other matters, the reliability of the recovery evidence, the absence of sealing or identifying marks on the seized articles, the non-examination of a seizure-list witness and the validity of the District Magistrate’s sanction.

The only examined seizure-list witness denied the recoveries and stated that he had signed a blank paper.

1. Whether the concurrent findings of conviction were perverse or legally unsustainable in light of the alleged defects in proving the recoveries, including the unsealed and unidentified seized articles and the seizure-list witness’s testimony.

2. Whether the sanction order, which the petitioners alleged did not demonstrate application of mind to the facts of the case, could sustain the prosecution under the Arms Act.

3. Whether the challenged judgments and sentence should be set aside in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

The prosecution was required to prove the offences charged under Sections 25(1-B)(a), 26 and 35 of the Arms Act, including the alleged possession and recovery of the relevant arms or ammunition.

The Court stated that seizure evidence should be supported by independent witnesses and that seized articles should be sealed or otherwise identifiable to safeguard against tampering or false implication; it treated the failure to do so as material in the circumstances of this case.

It also stated that a sanction order must reflect the sanctioning authority’s application of mind to the facts; a bare endorsement accepting a recommendation, without relevant case particulars, was inadequate.

In revision, the Court noted that interference with concurrent findings is not ordinarily warranted unless gross perversity is shown.

The Court found material defects in the proof of recovery: the sole examined seizure-list witness did not support the prosecution and said he had signed a blank paper; the other seizure-list witness was not examined; and the evidence of the informant, the malkhana in-charge and the investigating officer indicated that the seized articles had not been sealed at recovery.

The articles also lacked identifying marks or labels linking them to the petitioners, undermining proof that the items produced or examined were those allegedly recovered.

The Court further considered the sanction order defective because it merely accepted the Superintendent of Police’s recommendation and did not disclose consideration of the material facts of the alleged recovery.

It held that these material infirmities had not been addressed by the courts below and rendered their findings perverse for purposes of revision.

It directed their release forthwith unless their custody was required in another case, disposed of any pending interlocutory applications, and directed that the trial court record be returned.