Arms licence cannot be denied solely for lack of specific threat, Patna High Court rules

The petitioner applied in 2017 for an N.P. bore revolver/pistol licence for protection of his life and property.

The Station House Officer, Civil Lines Police Station, reported that the petitioner had good moral character, no criminal antecedents, and no adverse complaint.

The application was thereafter recommended by the S.D.P.O., Town, Gaya, and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Gaya, and forwarded to the District Magistrate, Gaya.

The District Magistrate rejected the application on 30 July 2019, principally on the grounds that the police report disclosed no specific threat perception, no criminal incident had occurred against the petitioner, and the nature of his business did not justify the grant of an arms licence.

The petitioner’s appeal, Arms Appeal No. 194 of 2022, was dismissed by the Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya, on 7 September 2023.

Whether the District Magistrate and the appellate authority could reject the petitioner’s arms-licence application solely or substantially on the ground that there was no specific threat perception or imminent danger to him?

Whether the petitioner’s application could be rejected for non-compliance with the safety-training requirement under Rule 10(1) of the Arms Rules, 2016, when the Central Government had not issued the notification contemplated by Rule 10(3)?

Whether the orders dated 30 July 2019 and 7 September 2023 were legally sustainable in view of the favourable police recommendations and the statutory framework governing arms licences?

The Court applied Sections 14 and 17 of the Arms Act, 1959, holding that the grant, refusal, renewal, or cancellation of an arms licence is a statutory privilege and not a fundamental right, but that the licensing authority must act on objective, relevant, and recorded reasons rather than vague allegations, arbitrariness, or caprice.

The Court further held that an arms licence cannot be denied solely because the applicant lacks a specific or imminent threat, and that police verification and threat assessments must be meaningfully evaluated.

Rule 12(3)(a) of the Arms Rules, 2016 was relevant to assessment of the applicant’s occupation or business.

Rules 10(1) and 10(3) govern the safety-training requirement; however, training could not be insisted upon in the absence of the Central Government’s notification prescribing the effective date and duration of such training.

The Court also considered the principle stated in Vijay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, C.W.J.C. No. 10784 of 2022, that absence of a specific threat is not, by itself, a sufficient basis to refuse an arms licence.

The Court found that the District Magistrate’s decision and the Commissioner’s affirmance rested substantially on the absence of a specific threat perception, notwithstanding the favourable reports of the S.H.O., S.D.P.O., and Sub-Divisional Officer regarding the petitioner’s character and antecedents.

The Court held that the authorities had applied an unduly restrictive standard by treating the absence of an immediate threat or prior criminal incident as determinative.

The petitioner’s status as an agriculturist and businessman, together with the location of his land in an area affected by Naxal activity, was a relevant circumstance requiring proper consideration.

The State’s objection based on Rule 10(1) also failed because the State’s supplementary counter-affidavit admitted that the Central Government had not issued the notification contemplated under Rule 10(3) prescribing the effective date and duration of the safety-training course.

Consequently, the licensing authorities’ orders were found to be inconsistent with the statutory safeguards under the Arms Act and Rules.

The order dated 30 July 2019 passed by the District Magistrate, Gaya, in Arms Licence Case No. 76 of 2019, and the appellate order dated 7 September 2023 passed by the Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya, in Arms Appeal No. 194 of 2022, were quashed.

The District Magistrate was directed to reconsider the petitioner’s application, taking into account that he was an agriculturist and businessman requiring protection in an area where Naxal activity had not been completely eradicated.

The writ petition was accordingly allowed, and pending interlocutory applications were disposed of.