Article 226 cannot adjudicate disputed property title or possession; parties must approach the civil court.

The petitioner sought protection against alleged forcible eviction from the house in which she and her family were residing, attributing the threatened dispossession to Respondent No. 8, an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, and the police authorities.

According to the petitioner, a tenancy dispute with the landlady was settled when the landlady agreed to sell the house to the petitioner’s husband; an agreement was executed and ₹10 lakhs was paid pursuant to it.

The petitioner alleged that, despite this agreement, the landlady subsequently executed a registered sale deed in favour of Shailendra Kumar Rai, Respondent No. 9, and that the police acted at the purchaser’s instance to evict her.

She further alleged that the house was demolished, resulting in her dispossession, and stated that she was taking steps to institute a civil suit.

The State contended that the police had taken all requisite steps on the complaints received and had no role in the petitioner’s eviction; it also submitted that the petitioner had produced no document establishing her right over the property.

Respondent No. 9 asserted that he was a bona fide purchaser under a valid sale deed, had obtained municipal mutation and an electricity connection, and disputed the petitioner’s alleged tenancy and possession.

1. Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, could adjudicate the disputed questions concerning title, possession, tenancy, and the parties’ competing claims over the property.

2. Whether the petitioner was entitled to a writ directing the police authorities to protect her claimed possession or restrain her alleged forcible eviction without first establishing her civil rights before an appropriate civil court.

The Court applied the principle that jurisdiction under Article 226 is extraordinary and supervisory in nature, intended to ensure that public authorities act within the bounds of law and jurisdiction, rather than to determine private rights relating to property.

Relying on Mohd. Hanif v. State of Assam, (1969) 2 SCC 782, the Court held that writ jurisdiction is primarily a public-law remedy and is not ordinarily available for declaring or adjudicating private rights.

It further relied on P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami Dharmananda Theertha Padar, (2006) 4 SCC 501, for the proposition that approaching the writ court to resolve disputed questions of title is an abuse of process where the civil court is the appropriate forum.

Accordingly, disputed claims concerning title, tenancy, possession, and alleged dispossession must ordinarily be determined in civil proceedings.

The Court found that the petitioner’s claim depended upon disputed factual and civil questions, including the alleged agreement to sell, payment of ₹10 lakhs, the subsequent registered sale deed in favour of Respondent No. 9, the existence of a tenancy, the parties’ possession, and the alleged role of the police in the eviction and demolition.

The affidavit of the State authorities indicated that the police had taken the requisite steps in accordance with law, and the Court did not find a basis for issuing a public-law direction against them.

Since determination of the petitioner’s claimed possession and proprietary or tenancy rights would require adjudication of contested evidence, the Court held that Article 226 was not the appropriate forum for granting the requested protection.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate civil court for redressal of her grievance.

All pending interlocutory applications, if any, were also disposed of.