Article 227 Does Not Permit Reappraisal of Tribunal Findings Supported by Policy and Medical Board Evidence.

The petitioner, formerly a Havildar in the Territorial Army, was discharged on 2 February 2007 and re-enrolled in the Defence Security Corps (DSC) as a Sepoy the following day.

In the first petition, he challenged the Armed Forces Tribunal’s refusal to restore his former rank and its non-consideration of certain allowance and clothing claims, which his counsel had not pressed before the Tribunal.

In the second petition, he challenged the Invaliding Medical Board proceedings and his discharge on 14 March 2015 for recurrent depressive disorder, seeking reinstatement and action against the psychiatrist who examined him.

The High Court considered both challenges under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the Tribunal’s refusal to restore the petitioner to the rank of Havildar disclosed a ground for interference under Article 227, including whether restoration was an automatic entitlement after attestation.

Whether the petitioner could revive his allowance and clothing claims in the High Court when they had not been pressed before the Tribunal.

Whether the Tribunal’s decision upholding the Invaliding Medical Board and the petitioner’s discharge was perverse or otherwise liable to interference under Article 227, including on grounds of alleged bias, absence of a temporary medical category, and denial of notice or hearing.

Whether the petitioner had a right to continue in DSC service until age 57 or was entitled to action against the psychiatrist.

Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction is correctional, not appellate: interference is warranted for jurisdictional error, patent perversity, disregard of a binding provision or material evidence causing grave injustice, or breach of basic natural justice; it does not permit routine reappraisal of facts (Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., and Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil).

Paragraph 26 of the Defence Security Corps Policy Compendium, 1986 makes re-enrolment in the former rank subject to Government-prescribed percentages and available vacancies; the 2001 Army Headquarters policy provided for restoration consideration through a separate seniority roster, subject to vacancy and promotion criteria.

Under Army Rule 13(3), discharge for medical unfitness under item III(iii) is to be made on the recommendation of an Invalidating Board; the show-cause requirement in item (v) applies to other classes of discharge (Smt. Sulekha Rani v. Union of India and Union of India v. Rajpal Singh).

A Medical Board’s expert opinion is entitled to primacy in medical-fitness determinations (Union of India v. Ex Rfn Ravinder Kumar).

The petitioner was re-enrolled after the 2001 policy took effect, and paragraph 26 did not confer an automatic right to his former rank.

The Tribunal found that his name had not entered the relevant seniority roster before his invalidment; the petitioner produced no roster, vacancy information, or evidence that his turn had arisen.

His bare assertion that juniors had been restored was insufficient, and the claims for allowances and clothing had been given up before the Tribunal and involved disputed facts.

In the medical-discharge challenge, the specialist’s reasoned opinion was considered by a duly constituted Invaliding Medical Board, and the petitioner produced no independent medical evidence to displace it.

The record also showed that he had previously been placed in temporary low medical categories, while he identified no rule requiring a further temporary category before invalidment after recurrence of the illness.

The Court found no substantiated bias.

Although the petitioner alleged that notice was required under paragraph 424 of the 2010 Regulations, he had already made written objections before the Board convened and showed no resulting prejudice; the Invalidating Board procedure required by Rule 13(3)(III)(iii) had been followed.

He identified no rule entitling him to serve until age 57.

It dismissed both Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 388 and 389 of 2025, made no order as to costs, and closed any pending applications.