Article 227 jurisdiction cannot disturb discretionary delay condonation absent perversity or gross illegality.

Respondent No. 1 sought to challenge the trial court’s judgment and decree by filing a regular civil appeal with a delay of 171 days.

In the delay-condonation application, he stated that he was approximately 75 years old, had been hospitalised as an indoor patient at Unicare Hospital, and, being a Saint, had to travel to different ashrams and faced difficulty in appointing a power-of-attorney holder.

The petitioners opposed condonation, contending that no medical documents were produced and that respondent No. 1 had previously been represented through a power of attorney before the trial court.

The appellate court condoned the delay on 14 July 2026, finding sufficient cause and observing that the delay was not inordinate and would not prejudice the petitioners.

The appellate court subsequently corrected an observation in paragraph 7 of its order from “no objection of respondent” to “objection of respondent”.

The petitioners challenged the condonation order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the appellate court properly exercised its discretion in condoning the 171-day delay in filing the regular civil appeal despite the petitioners’ objections and the absence of supporting medical documents.

Whether the High Court should interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution with an appellate court’s discretionary order condoning delay, where the order is neither perverse nor grossly erroneous.

The Court applied the principle governing condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, namely that “sufficient cause” must be assessed through a discretionary, justice-oriented approach, with the acceptability of the explanation being more significant than the length of the delay.

Relying on N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Court held that a superior court should ordinarily not disturb a positive order condoning delay unless the discretion was exercised on wholly untenable, arbitrary, or perverse grounds.

Under Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through LRs v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531, appellate interference is justified only where the order is clearly wrong and not merely because another view is possible.

The Court also relied on Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 519, for the proposition that an allegation that oral submissions were not recorded should ordinarily be raised before the court that passed the order.

The supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited and does not equate to appellate jurisdiction; interference is warranted only for perversity, gross error, or violation of settled legal principles, as recognised in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, and Sameer Suresh Gupta through P.A. Holder v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, (2013) 9 SCC 374.

The High Court held that the appellate court had considered the relevant circumstances, including respondent No. 1’s advanced age, hospitalisation, status as a Saint, and the fact that the delay was 171 days and not inordinate.

Although the petitioners claimed that their objections and oral submissions were ignored, the reply had been taken into account, and the correction of the factual error in paragraph 7 demonstrated that the petitioners had an adequate remedy before the appellate court itself.

The Court found that the petitioners’ prior use of a power of attorney did not conclusively disprove the explanation for the subsequent delay, particularly in view of respondent No. 1’s age and illness; nor had the petitioners produced positive evidence showing that he was fit and able to institute the appeal within limitation.

Since the appellate court had positively exercised its discretion upon finding sufficient cause, and its order was neither arbitrary, perverse, nor grossly erroneous, Article 227 could not be invoked merely to substitute another possible view.

It held that the appellate court had validly condoned the 171-day delay upon sufficient cause and that no ground existed for supervisory interference under Article 227.

The Special Civil Application was dismissed in limine, and no order was made as to costs.