Article 227 jurisdiction cannot reappreciate discretionary injunction orders absent perversity, arbitrariness, or grave injustice.

The petitioners claimed to be tenants of the suit premises and asserted tenancy rights as legal heirs of their deceased father, the alleged original tenant. Apprehending forcible dispossession and demolition of the premises by the respondents-landlords, they filed Regular Civil Suit No. 72 of 2026 before the Civil Court at Navsari, seeking permanent injunction and interim protection under Exhibit 5.

The Trial Court rejected the injunction application on 18 June 2026, principally finding that the petitioners had not produced a rent agreement or consistent rent receipts, had not established their present possession or statutory tenancy, and had suppressed notices issued by the Navsari Municipal Corporation concerning the dilapidated condition of the property.

The appellate court dismissed the petitioners’ appeal on 25 June 2026, holding that the Trial Court had properly considered the documentary material and the requirements for interim injunction.

The petitioners consequently invoked the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioners established a prima facie right as statutory tenants and were consequently entitled to interim protection against dispossession or demolition of the suit premises?

Whether the Trial Court and the appellate court acted illegally, perversely, or without jurisdiction in refusing interim injunction despite the petitioners’ claim of tenancy and possession?

Whether the petitioners were entitled to an injunction restraining demolition when municipal notices had directed removal of portions of the premises allegedly found to be structurally unsafe?

The Court applied the limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, holding that the High Court does not act as an appellate court to reappreciate evidence or correct every factual or legal error; interference is justified only for jurisdictional failure, patent illegality, perversity, grave dereliction, or resulting grave injustice, as explained in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675, M/s Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181, and Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97.

For interim injunction, the applicant must establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable injury, in accordance with Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719, as reiterated in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 110.

Under Section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Gujarat Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, tenancy succession depends, inter alia, upon the family member having resided with the tenant at the time of the tenant’s death.

The Court also treated injunction as an equitable remedy requiring disclosure of material facts and clean hands.

Sections 13(1)(hh) and 13(1)(hhh) of the Rent Act were relied upon by the petitioners in support of their argument that eviction on grounds of dilapidation required recourse to the statutory process.

The High Court found that the petitioners had not established a prima facie tenancy. They produced neither a rent agreement nor regular rent receipts; the available receipts were sporadic and ended in September 1999, while no rent payment thereafter was shown.

Although municipal assessment records identified the deceased father as an occupier or tenant, the petitioners’ own status as successors remained a matter requiring trial. In particular, the pleadings did not specifically establish that they had been residing with their father in the premises when he died, as required under Section 5(11)(c)(i) of the Rent Act.

The Court further noted that the petitioners were allegedly residing elsewhere and had not demonstrated actual possession of the suit premises.

Independently, the municipal notices issued between 2024 and 2026 recorded that the property was old, structurally weak, and partly dangerous, and directed removal of the damaged portions.

The petitioners had not disclosed these notices in the plaint or joined the Municipal Corporation as a party, nor had they produced a structural stability report or evidence that the respondents were attempting to demolish the entire property rather than the dangerous portions.

Since the petitioners failed to establish a prima facie case, the Court held that the requirements of balance of convenience and irreparable injury also remained unsatisfied.

The concurrent, reasoned findings of the courts below disclosed no perversity, arbitrariness, jurisdictional error, or grave injustice warranting intervention under Article 227.

The municipal notices concerning the dangerous condition of the property, coupled with the petitioners’ suppression of material facts and failure to implead the Municipal Corporation, further disentitled them to equitable interim relief.

Finding no perversity or illegality in the orders dated 18 June 2026 and 25 June 2026, the Court dismissed the Article 227 petition in limine and declined the prayers for quashing the subordinate-court orders and granting injunction or status quo.

No order as to costs.