Article 227 jurisdiction cannot reappreciate settled objections or interfere with non-perverse execution orders.

M/s Competent Automobiles Co. Ltd. obtained a decree for specific performance of a lease agreement concerning 11 kanals of land at Tika Tikkar, Hamirpur.

The Trial Court had initially granted only permanent prohibitory injunction and declined specific performance; however, the First Appellate Court modified the decree and directed the defendants to execute and register the lease deed in favour of the plaintiff within three months.

The decree attained finality after dismissal of the second appeal for non-prosecution.

The plaintiff thereafter initiated execution proceedings under Order XXI Rules 32 and 34(5) read with Section 151 CPC and filed a draft lease deed.

The judgment-debtors objected that execution was barred without permission under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, that the plaintiff was a non-agriculturist, that the decree was incapable of execution under Rule 38, and that the proposed 99-year lease was contrary to the applicable Government notification.

The Executing Court rejected the objections, allowed execution, and appointed a Local Commissioner to execute the lease deed and hand over possession in accordance with law.

The judgment-debtors challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the Executing Court exceeded its jurisdiction by directing execution of the lease deed through a Local Commissioner despite the judgment-debtors’ objections concerning statutory compliance and the terms of the proposed deed?

Whether the objections based on the absence of permission under Section 118 and Rule 38 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act could be reconsidered at the stage of execution?

Whether the impugned order disclosed perversity, jurisdictional error, or a grave violation of law warranting interference under Article 227?

The Court applied the limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, under which the High Court does not act as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence, and interferes only for jurisdictional excess, gross abuse, perversity, or grave dereliction of duty.

Under Order XXI Rules 32 and 34 CPC, an executing court may secure compliance with a decree directing execution of a document, consider objections to the draft, approve or modify it to conform to the decree, and have the document executed through an appointed officer.

The executing court cannot travel beyond or modify the decree, but may construe and implement it in accordance with its terms, as held in Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan, (2022) 14 SCC 609.

The Court also relied on M/s Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 INSC 606, and Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprises Ltd. v. B. Gurappa Naidu, 2026 INSC 434, concerning the restricted scope of Article 227.

A finding is perverse only where it is based on no evidence, unreliable evidence, ignored relevant material, inadmissible material, or is so irrational that no reasonable court could reach it.

The Court further held that objections concerning permission under Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, once addressed in the substantive proceedings and in view of the permission relied upon by the decree-holder, could not be used to obstruct execution.

The decree specifically directed the defendants to execute and register the lease deed, and the decree had attained finality; consequently, the Executing Court was required to implement it rather than reopen the underlying statutory and contractual questions.

The execution application and draft lease deed referred to Government permission dated 6 February 2015 under Section 118, and the judgment-debtors failed to demonstrate how that permission was legally insufficient or had not been complied with.

Their objections regarding the plaintiff’s status, locus standi, non-joinder, and the alleged statutory bar substantially sought reconsideration of matters already dealt with in the original proceedings, which was impermissible in execution.

Since the agreement and decree contemplated a 99-year lease, the objection to that duration did not establish that the draft travelled beyond the decree.

Although an executing court must ensure that the draft conforms to the decree before directing execution, the Court found that the Executing Court had considered the objections and that its order did not amount to enlarging or altering the decree.

No perversity, jurisdictional excess, or gross abuse of process was established to justify Article 227 intervention.

The parties were directed to appear before the Executing Court on 7 September 2026 at 10:00 a.m.; pending applications were disposed of, and the record was directed to be sent back forthwith.