Article 243Q(2) notifications are legislative acts; individual hearing or prior consultation with village panchayats is not mandatory.

This batch of petitions challenges various notifications issued by the Urban Development and Urban Housing Department of Gujarat under Article 243Q(2) of the Constitution of India.

These notifications merged several village panchayats into existing Municipalities or Municipal Corporations.

The petitioners, comprising village panchayats and residents, argued that the notifications were issued without following the mandatory parameters of Article 243Q(2), such as population density, revenue generation, and non-agricultural employment.

They also alleged a lack of meaningful consultation as required by Section 7(2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993.

Procedurally, the court noted that during the pendency of these petitions, elections for the newly expanded municipal bodies were concluded in April 2026, and elected representatives had assumed office.

1. Whether the notifications are invalidated for non-compliance with the factors prescribed under Article 243Q(2) of the Constitution.

2. Whether the scope of judicial review extends to examining the adequacy of material considered by the State.

3. Whether consultation with an Administrator, rather than an elected body, violates Section 7(2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act.

4. Whether the court should exercise writ jurisdiction to quash foundational notifications after the completion of the electoral process and assumption of office by elected representatives.

The court applied Article 243Q(2) of the Constitution, which empowers the Governor to specify urban areas "having regard to" specific demographic and economic factors.

It relied on the Supreme Court's decision in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Khetoliya, which held that Article 243Q does not require a separate notification or an independent adjudicatory procedure, as the function is legislative.

The court also applied Section 7(2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, regarding consultation for the cesser of a village.

It distinguished Champa Lal v. State of Rajasthan based on subsequent larger bench clarifications that "having regard to" implies consideration of factors rather than an exhaustive recital in the notification.

Finally, it applied the principle of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, where the court may refuse relief if it unsettles completed democratic processes.

The court reasoned that the issuance of a notification under Article 243Q(2) is a legislative/policy function, not a quasi-judicial one.

Consequently, the principles of natural justice and individual hearings are not mandatory unless specified by statute.

Upon examining the original government files, the court found that the State had indeed collected and analyzed data on population, revenue, and infrastructure, satisfying the "having regard to" requirement.

The court rejected the argument that Section 7(2) of the Panchayats Act acts as a fetter on the Governor’s constitutional power under Article 243Q(2); the two operate in distinct fields, and the cesser of a village is an incidental consequence of municipal expansion.

Furthermore, consultation with an Administrator during an interregnum was deemed valid as the Administrator is a statutory functionary.

The court held that judicial review is limited to the legality of the decision-making process, not the wisdom of the policy.

Crucially, the court declined to interfere because the electoral process had already been completed and subsequent rights had intervened; quashing the notifications at this stage would create an administrative vacuum and unsettle democratic institutions.

All interim reliefs were vacated.