At the Section 11 stage, disputed limitation issues must be left to the arbitral tribunal.

The respondent, Delhi Technological University, issued a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) in October 2010 for sanitation and housekeeping services.

The petitioner partnership firm submitted its bid, which was accepted in January 2011, and the parties executed a formal Contract Agreement dated 6 May 2011.

The contract stipulated that incremental wages arising from revision of statutory minimum wages would be paid by the respondent in accordance with the NIT and its terms and conditions.

The petitioner claimed that, although it paid employees at revised minimum-wage rates from April 2011 onwards, the respondent continued making payments at pre-revised rates.

The petitioner raised claims and sent repeated reminders and supporting statements between 2014 and 2024; the respondent also sought further particulars for processing the alleged dues.

The contract was terminated on 30 May 2018.

The petitioner invoked arbitration by notice dated 12 August 2025, but the respondent neither replied nor appointed an arbitrator. The Section 11 petition was filed on 20 September 2025.

The respondent opposed the petition on limitation, non-existence of an arbitration agreement, and lack of authorization of the person instituting the proceedings.

Whether the Section 11 petition was barred by limitation, and whether the underlying wage-reimbursement claims were ex facie dead or time-barred.

Whether the arbitration clause contained in Clause 59 of the NIT and appended terms and conditions was incorporated into the Contract Agreement dated 6 May 2011.

Whether the petition was liable to be rejected because it was instituted by a person allegedly lacking due authorization from the petitioner partnership firm.

Whether the contractual provision authorizing the respondent’s Vice Chancellor to appoint the sole arbitrator could be acted upon, or whether an independent arbitrator had to be appointed by the Court.

Under Section 11(6-A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the referral court must confine its examination to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement and must not conduct a mini-trial on substantive jurisdictional or evidentiary issues.

Limitation applies to a Section 11 petition under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and ordinarily begins when a valid arbitration notice is followed by the opposite party’s failure or refusal to act; however, the referral court should not undertake an intricate evidentiary inquiry into limitation of the substantive claims.

Under Section 7(5), an arbitration clause in another document is incorporated where the contract clearly refers to that document and demonstrates an intention to incorporate it, provided the clause is capable of applying to the disputes; incorporation is especially established where the contract states that the referred terms form part of the agreement.

A procedural defect concerning authorization is curable and should not result in dismissal where it can be rectified without prejudice.

A unilateral right conferred on an interested party to appoint a sole arbitrator is invalid under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, absent an express written waiver; the Court must therefore appoint an independent arbitrator.

The Court found that the Section 11 petition was filed within three years of the respondent’s failure to act upon the arbitration notice dated 12 August 2025.

Although the respondent contended that the wage claims related to 2011–2015 and were barred after termination of the contract in 2018, the parties’ extensive correspondence continued until 2024 and raised factual questions concerning acknowledgment, the parties’ conduct, and whether the dispute remained live.

Those questions could not be conclusively determined at the referral stage and were left for the arbitral tribunal.

On incorporation, Clause 2 of the Contract Agreement expressly provided that the letter of acceptance, terms and conditions, NIT, bill of quantities, scope of work, addenda, and other contract documents would form part of the agreement.

The NIT and the Contract Agreement were therefore components of a single composite contractual transaction, unlike the two-contract situation considered in NBCC.

Clause 59 of the NIT was consequently prima facie incorporated and supplied a binding arbitration agreement.

The authorization objection was also rejected because the petition had been filed by a partner and, in any event, all partners subsequently authorized the concerned representative by letter dated 17 September 2025; any deficiency was procedural and curable.

Finally, because Clause 59 granted the respondent’s Vice Chancellor unilateral power to appoint the sole arbitrator, that mechanism was inoperable, requiring appointment of an independent arbitrator by the Court.

Since the contractual unilateral appointment mechanism was invalid, the Court appointed Ms. Aastha Chawla, Advocate, as the independent sole arbitrator.

She was directed to furnish the disclosures required under Section 12 of the A&C Act and was entitled to fees under the Fourth Schedule or as otherwise agreed.

All jurisdictional objections, including limitation and the existence of the arbitration agreement, as well as the parties’ claims and counterclaims, were expressly kept open for determination by the arbitral tribunal.

The petition was disposed of accordingly.