Attachment Before Judgment Requires Cogent Evidence of Intent to Obstruct Decree Execution.

The petitioner, a former employee of respondent No. 1, sued challenging his dismissal and claiming damages of ₹2.5 crore.

During the suit, he sought attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).

The trial court rejected the application, observing that attachment before judgment is a drastic remedy and that the case did not warrant attachment.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

The High Court noted that the application was filed in 2016, that the petitioner had not commenced evidence, and that respondent No. 1 had since been renamed Manipal Hospitals Private Limited.

1. Whether the requirements for attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC were established on the material placed by the petitioner

2. Whether the trial court’s refusal to order attachment warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution

Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC empowers a court to order attachment before judgment where, on cogent material, the defendant is about to dispose of or remove property, or is otherwise dealing with it, with the intention of obstructing or delaying execution of a prospective decree.

This extraordinary and drastic power must be exercised sparingly and with care; a plaintiff’s apprehension that a claim may remain unsatisfied, or the size of the claim alone, is insufficient.

The Court relied on Prem Raj Jain v. Bank of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 730; Raman Tech. & Process Engg. Co. v. Solanki Traders, (2008) 2 SCC 302; and Rajendran v. Shankar Sundaram, (2008) 2 SCC 724, as authorities on the principles governing attachment before judgment.

The petitioner’s substantial damages claim did not, by itself, justify attachment.

His affidavit contained no tangible material showing that the defendants were about to alienate, dissipate, remove, or otherwise deal with property to defeat or delay execution of a possible decree; the necessary foundational facts were therefore absent.

The Court also considered the passage of time since the 2016 application, the subsequent change in respondent No. 1’s name, and the petitioner’s failure to commence evidence.

In those circumstances, the old application could not support extraordinary relief in 2026, and no basis for interfering with the trial court’s discretionary decision was shown.

The writ petition was dismissed as devoid of merit.