Authorities cannot cancel a property allotment affecting an occupying purchaser without prior notice.

Site No. 1104 was allotted to respondent No. 5 in 1982.

An order cancelling the allotment was quashed by the High Court in 1996, and the matter was remanded for reconsideration after notice and an opportunity of hearing.

Respondent No. 5 subsequently sold the site to respondent No. 6 in 2009, who sold it to the petitioner in 2010.

The petitioner’s name was mutated in the revenue records; she obtained a sanctioned building plan, constructed a house, and paid property tax.

In 2015, respondent No. 1 again cancelled the original allotment without notice to the petitioner.

The petitioner sought to quash that order insofar as it concerned Site No. 1104.

Whether the authorities could cancel the allotment after the petitioner had acquired an interest in the site and constructed a house, without serving her notice or providing a hearing.

Whether the authorities’ delay of nearly 19 years in acting on the liberty reserved by the 1996 remand order affected the validity of the subsequent cancellation.

Exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Court applied the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness: where administrative action may adversely affect a person’s rights or interests in property, that person must receive due notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The Court also applied the principle that action taken under liberty reserved by a remand order must be initiated within a reasonable period.

The 1996 order had set aside the earlier cancellation, and the authorities did not act on the reserved liberty for nearly 19 years.

During that period, the allottee transferred the site, the petitioner acquired it through a registered sale deed, and the authorities recorded her name, sanctioned construction, and received property tax.

Because the later cancellation affected the petitioner’s interests and she was in occupation of a site on which she had built a house, the authorities were required to notify and hear her. They admittedly did neither.

The delayed action and absence of notice therefore rendered the cancellation unsustainable insofar as it concerned Site No. 1104.

It left the authorities at liberty to commence fresh proceedings in accordance with law, provided they serve notice on the petitioner, afford her a personal hearing, and thereafter pass an appropriate order.

The writ petition was disposed of accordingly.