Authorities must assess premature-release claims under the correct policy category, without extending stricter criteria beyond express terms.

The petitioner challenged the order dated 05.09.2025 passed by the State Level Committee, whereby her request for premature release was rejected and consideration was deferred for two years under the Haryana Prisons Rules, 2022.

She contended that she had undergone 12 years, 1 month and 26 days of actual imprisonment and 19 years, 2 months and 9 days including remission, and had thereby satisfied the eligibility requirements under Rule 187(2)(b)(ii).

Her conduct during the preceding five years was stated to be “Good,” with no subsequent adverse case or circumstance, and she was not categorised as a hardcore or hardened criminal.

On examining the record, the Court found that the petitioner’s case was not covered by the more stringent categories under Clause 2-A of the Haryana Government Gazette dated 30.12.2022, including “murder of more than two persons in one case,” but was required to be considered under Clause 2-B.

The Court applied Rule 187(2)(b)(ii) of the Haryana Prisons Rules, 2022, concerning eligibility for consideration for premature release, along with Rule 187(2)(4), concerning the prisoner’s conduct.

It also applied the Haryana Government Gazette policy dated 30.12.2022, particularly the distinction between the categories under Clause 2-A and the cases falling under Clause 2-B; the more stringent requirements under Clause 2-A cannot be extended beyond the categories expressly specified therein.

The Court also considered the principles stated in Pohlu @ Polu Ram v. State of Haryana and Others , CRWP-8232-2022, decided on 05.02.2024, and Raju @ Rajesh v. State of Haryana and Others , CRWP-2160-2024, decided on 11.03.2024, which were relied upon by the petitioner in support of consideration of her premature-release claim.

The Court found that, as on the date of the impugned order, the petitioner had completed 12 years, 1 month and 26 days of actual imprisonment and had earned a total sentence of 19 years, 2 months and 9 days including remission.

It held that her case did not fall within any category under Clause 2-A and therefore could not be subjected to the more stringent parameters applicable to that clause; instead, it was required to be assessed under Clause 2-B.

Further, the impugned order contained no adverse finding that the petitioner’s conduct was bad or otherwise disentitled her from consideration for premature release.

The State Level Committee had therefore failed to properly consider the petitioner’s actual incarceration, remission, applicable policy classification and conduct. This incorrect application of the policy constituted a material infirmity warranting judicial interference.

The petition was disposed of, the impugned order was set aside, and the competent authorities were directed to reconsider the petitioner’s case afresh strictly in accordance with the applicable policy and the Court’s observations, by passing a fresh, reasoned and speaking order within one month from receipt of a certified copy of the judgment.