Availability of civil remedies does not bar criminal prosecution if the allegations prima facie disclose cheating.

The petitioner filed a petition under Section 528 of BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) seeking to quash FIR No. 196/2019 registered under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC.

The complainant, a retired DSP, alleged that the petitioner induced him to pay Rs. 10,00,000/- as advance for a residential plot by showing misleading documents and public notices.

Despite the payment (verified via bank records), the petitioner allegedly failed to execute the sale deed, attempted to sell the property to third parties in 2016, and eventually refused to refund the money, denying the existence of any agreement.

The petitioner argued the dispute was purely civil, that a prior 2017 police inquiry had found him innocent, and that the FIR was a retaliatory counterblast to his own criminal case against the complainant’s associates.

1. Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose the commission of cognizable offences under Sections 420 and 406 of the IPC or represent a purely civil breach of contract.

2. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings based on a prior preliminary police inquiry or the existence of cross-cases.

The court primarily applied Section 528 of the BNSS (Section 482 of the CrPC), which governs the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law.

It relied on the principle that quashment is an exceptional remedy to be used sparingly only when no cognizable offence is made out.

Regarding Section 420 IPC, the court noted that the "sine qua non" is fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of the inducement.

For Section 406 IPC, the court identified the necessity of "entrustment" of property.

It further applied the doctrine that the availability of a civil remedy does not bar criminal prosecution if elements of deception and wrongful gain are present.

The court reasoned that while the petitioner characterized the matter as a civil property dispute, the specific allegations of misrepresentation (using old public notices to induce payment) and the subsequent denial of the transaction's existence point toward prima facie* criminal intent.

The court observed that the petitioner was aware the property title was clouded or disputed before accepting the advance, which raises a factual question regarding dishonest intention that must be tested at trial rather than in a summary proceeding.

It further held that a preliminary police inquiry (the 2017 report) does not constitute a judicial determination and cannot foreclose the statutory power of investigation into a cognizable offence.

The court concluded that determining the "intention" of the accused is a matter of evidence-gathering during investigation and cannot be decided at the threshold.

The court dismissed the petition, refusing to quash the FIR, as it did not find the allegations to be "patently absurd" or "inherently improbable."

The investigating agency was directed to proceed in accordance with law, while clarifying that the observations made were limited to this petition and not a reflection on the final merits of the case.