Award by Court-appointed Sole Arbitrator is Governed by Arbitration Act 1996, Not Gujarat Tribunal Act 1992

The respondent initially filed an arbitration reference before the Gujarat Works Tribunal under the Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992 ("Act, 1992") in 2015

Due to the Tribunal’s non-functionality, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, under Article 142, appointed a sole arbitrator (Hon’ble Mr. Justice C.K. Thakker) with the consent of both parties

The arbitrator passed an award on 20/01/2022

The applicant first challenged this award via a writ petition (SCA No. 602 of 2023), admitting therein that the limitation period under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Act, 1996") had expired

After the High Court observed that the award should be challenged under Section 34 of the Act, 1996, the applicant withdrew the writ and filed the present Civil Revision Applications under Section 12 of the Act, 1992, along with applications to condone a delay of over 1400 days

1. Whether a revision application under Section 12 of the Act, 1992 is maintainable against an award passed by a sole arbitrator appointed by the Supreme Court with the consent of parties, rather than by the statutory Tribunal itself

2. Whether the court can entertain a delay condonation application if the underlying substantive petition is fundamentally not maintainable

The court applied Section 12 of the Gujarat Public Works Contracts Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992, which provides for the High Court's power of revision against awards passed by the Tribunal

The court also distinguished this from the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, specifically Section 34, which governs the setting aside of arbitral awards passed by private or court-appointed arbitrators

The court also referenced the doctrine that what cannot be done directly (challenging an award after the expiration of limitation under the Act, 1996) cannot be done indirectly by misvoking another statute's jurisdiction

The court reasoned that although the arbitration originated under the Act, 1992, the Subsequent appointment of a sole arbitrator by the Supreme Court based on party agreement transformed the nature of the proceedings

This arbitrator did not constitute "the Tribunal" as defined under Sections 3 to 6 of the Act, 1992

The Supreme Court's direction to "recommence" from the stage reached before the Tribunal was merely a procedural efficiency instruction and did not subject the resulting award to the Act, 1992

Furthermore, the applicant’s own prior admissions in the withdrawn writ petition—acknowledging that the Act, 1996 applied and that the limitation period for a Section 34 challenge had lapsed—estopped them from now claiming the Act, 1992 applied

The court concluded that since the award was governed by the Act, 1996, the remedy under Section 12 of the Act, 1992 was legally unavailable

Consequently, the applications for condonation of delay were rejected as the underlying petitions could not be entertained

The court discharged the notices and directed the Registry to refuse registration of the civil revision applications