Bail order is not perverse if role-based distinction is supported by complainant's Section 183 BNSS statement.

The petitioner filed an application under Section 483(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, seeking the cancellation of bail granted to Respondent No. 1, Vardichand, by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mahidpur.

Respondent No. 1 was accused in Crime No. 425/2025 involving offences under Sections 103(1) (murder), 190, 191(2), 191(3), and 296(b) of the BNS, 2023, and the Arms Act.

The petitioner argued that the Trial Court erroneously minimized the respondent’s role to merely "holding the deceased" and ignored the common object shared by the five accused.

Respondent No. 1 contended that his role was distinct, limited, and that the complainant's statement under Section 183 of the BNSS justified the grant of bail.

1. Whether the Trial Court committed a grave error or perversity in granting bail to Respondent No. 1 by misinterpreting his role in the alleged offence.

2. Whether the circumstances of the case warrant the exercise of the High Court’s power to cancel bail under Section 483(3) of the BNSS.

The Court applied the fundamental principle that "Bail is the rule and jail is the exception," rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

It exercised power under Section 483(3) of the BNSS (formerly Section 439(2) CrPC), noting that cancellation is a "harsh order" requiring cogent and overwhelming circumstances.

The Court relied on Victim 'X' v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) to distinguish between cancellation due to supervening misconduct and setting aside a perverse order.

furthermore, it applied the parameters established in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu (2022) regarding the judicial discretion required in bail matters.

The Court reviewed the case diary and the complainant's statement recorded under Section 183 BNSS (formerly 164 CrPC), finding that the Trial Court’s evaluation of the respondent’s role was consistent with the evidence.

It observed that the respondent’s role was specifically identified as "catching hold" and was distinct from the main accused who delivered the fatal blow.

The Court reasoned that since there was no evidence of the five accused arriving together or acting with a singular common object that would render the bail order "shocking to the conscience," the Trial Court's discretion was not perverse.

The Court emphasized that interference with a discretionary bail order should only occur in rare, exceptional cases involving legal infirmity.

Consequently, no case was made out for interference under Section 483(3) of the BNSS.

The High Court dismissed the application for cancellation of bail, affirming the Trial Court's order dated 20.01.2026.