Bar Association’s internal election eligibility disputes are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

The petitioner, an advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh in 2012 and claiming membership of the District Bar Association, Shopian since that year, challenged the Association’s amended Constitution of 2023.

The amendment enhanced the eligibility requirement from ten to fifteen years’ standing at the Bar for the offices of President and Vice-President, and from seven to ten years for Secretary.

The petitioner alleged that the amendment was adopted without proper notice, a valid General Body Meeting, or a lawful resolution, and sought production of the relevant records.

Following the issuance of Election Notification No. 01 dated 11 December 2025 on the basis of the amended Constitution, the petitioner sought quashment of both the amendment and the election notification.

The respondents contended that the Association was a private, voluntary body; that the amendment had been approved by the General Body after notice circulated through WhatsApp; and that the petition involved disputed questions of fact and was barred by delay, acquiescence and approbation and reprobation.

1. Whether the District Bar Association, Shopian is “State” or an instrumentality/agency of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India?

2. Whether the Association’s amendment of eligibility conditions for election to its internal offices constitutes the discharge of a public duty or public function so as to make it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226?

3. Whether the disputed questions concerning notice, convening of the General Body Meeting and adoption of the amendment could be adjudicated in proceedings under Article 226?

4. Whether the petitioner’s delay and alleged acquiescence in the operation of the amended Constitution disentitled him to discretionary relief under Article 226?

Article 12 encompasses the Government, legislatures, local authorities and other authorities, while the Article 12 inquiry depends upon statutory creation, statutory powers, governmental control and governmental or closely associated functions.

Applying Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857, the Court recognised that statutory creation and quasi-governmental powers may bring a body within Article 12.

Under Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722, factors such as governmental ownership, substantial financial assistance, State-conferred monopoly, deep and pervasive control, public importance of functions and transfer of a Government department are relevant indicia of an instrumentality or agency of the State.

Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111, requires a strong statutory character or deep and pervasive governmental control before an entity is treated as State or its instrumentality.

Although Article 226 is wider than Article 32 and may extend to a private body performing a public duty, Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajeevandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691, requires a positive obligation of a public character.

The Court also relied on authorities holding that internal election disputes of voluntary Bar Associations generally lack a public-law element and are not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Further, the doctrines of acquiescence and approbation and reprobation prevent a party from accepting or permitting a process to operate and later challenging its validity when it becomes disadvantageous, as explained in Union of India v. N. Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25, and Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corpn. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470.

The Association was neither created by statute nor under the Advocates Act, 1961; it was a voluntary body governed by its own Constitution and Bye-laws, with office-bearers elected by its members.

It exercised no statutory powers, performed no governmental functions and was not shown to be subject to deep or pervasive governmental control. It therefore did not qualify as “State” or an instrumentality or agency of the State under Article 12.

Although Article 226 can reach private bodies performing public duties, the impugned action concerned only the Association’s internal governance and the eligibility of its members to contest its offices.

It neither imposed a duty owed to the public at large nor possessed the requisite public-law character; the professional importance of advocates could not transform every internal act of a Bar Association into a public function.

The petitioner’s allegations regarding absence of notice, a General Body Meeting and a valid resolution were directly disputed by the respondents and required examination of records and evidence, which was inappropriate in writ proceedings.

Additionally, the amendment had allegedly operated since 2023 and governed subsequent elections, while the challenge was brought only after the 2025 election notification affected the petitioner’s eligibility. This conduct raised acquiescence and approbation-reprobation concerns and independently militated against discretionary relief.

The writ petition was therefore dismissed as not maintainable, along with connected applications, if any.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to pursue an appropriate remedy before the competent court in accordance with law.