Benefit of Probation of Offenders Act extended to elderly convict considering age and lapse of time.

On March 19, 2007, the Petitioner forcibly entered the victim's house at night and attempted to outrage her modesty.

He was caught by the victim's brother-in-law but escaped after a scuffle.

An FIR was filed on March 21, 2007.

The Trial Court convicted the Petitioner under Sections 451 and 354/511 of the IPC, sentencing him to one year of R.I. and a fine.

The Trial Court refused to grant relief under the Probation of Offenders Act (P.O. Act).

The Appellate Court subsequently affirmed the conviction and sentence.

The Petitioner filed this revision specifically seeking the benefit of the P.O. Act due to his age (73 years) and the lapse of 19 years since the occurrence.

1. Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, considering his advanced age and the duration of the litigation.

The Court primarily applied Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, which allows for the release of certain offenders on probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them to imprisonment.

It also applied Section 5 of the P.O. Act regarding the payment of compensation to the victim.

The Court relied on the precedent set by the Supreme Court in *Chellammal and anr. v. State represented by the Inspector of Police*, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 870, which provides guidance on the applicability of probation.

Additionally, procedural references were made to Sections 421 and 422 of the Cr.P.C. (Sections 461/462 of BNSS 2023) for the recovery of fines.

The Court noted that the Petitioner did not challenge the conviction on merits but sought leniency based on his age (73) and the fact that 19 years had passed since the incident.

The Court observed that the lower courts failed to adequately consider the Petitioner’s age when denying the benefit of the P.O. Act.

While the State opposed the relief citing the nature of the offence, the Court found that sending a 73-year-old to custody two decades after the event would serve no constructive purpose, especially since he had no other criminal record.

By applying the principles in *Chellammal*, the Court reasoned that the interests of justice would be met by substituting the substantive sentence with probation and a direct compensation payment of ₹3,000 to the victim.

It directed that the Petitioner be extended the benefit of Section 4 of the P.O. Act on terms to be settled by the Trial Court.

The Petitioner was ordered to pay ₹3,000 as compensation to the victim within 20 days, failing which the amount would be recovered as a fine under the relevant provisions of the Code.

The bail bonds were cancelled and the revision was disposed of.