Bihar intermediate exam scandal: Patna High Court quashes charges against former Board secretary, finding solitary call records insufficient

The petitioner, Sriniwas Chandra Tiwary, was prosecuted in connection with Kotwali P.S. Case No. 270 of 2016 and Special Case No. 32 of 2016 for offences under Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 188, 201 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, and Sections 8, 9 and 13(1) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The prosecution concerned alleged manipulation and irregularities in the Bihar Intermediate Examination, 2016, including the alleged preferential evaluation of answer sheets of students of Vishundeo Rai College, Kiratpur, Vaishali, and fraudulent enhancement of marks.

The petitioner contended that he had been Secretary of the Bihar School Examination Board only until 7 September 2015, before the commencement of the 2016 examination, and therefore had no role in its conduct.

His application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for discharge was rejected by the Special Judge, Vigilance-1st, Patna, on 16 November 2017. Charges were subsequently framed against him on 24 January 2018, which order was also challenged before the High Court.

The material relied upon against him principally consisted of call-detail records indicating limited communication with co-accused Lalkeshwar Prasad Singh and his wife, Usha Sinha, as referred to in paragraphs 455 and 520 of the case diary.

The State opposed the petition, stating that sufficient material existed and that three witnesses had already been examined at trial.

1. Whether the materials collected during investigation, particularly the limited call-detail records referring to communications with co-accused persons, constituted sufficient ground to proceed against the petitioner under Section 120B of the IPC and the other charged offences?

2. Whether the orders refusing discharge and framing charges against the petitioner were sustainable when the petitioner had ceased to serve in the Bihar School Examination Board before the 2016 examination process commenced?

3. Whether the petitioner’s prosecution could be quashed in exercise of the High Court’s jurisdiction where the alleged conspiracy was unsupported by independent connecting evidence?

The Court considered Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which permits discharge where the charge against the accused is groundless, and the principles governing interference at the stage of framing of charge.

It also considered Section 120B of the IPC, under which a criminal conspiracy requires material indicating an agreement or meeting of minds to commit an illegal act; mere association or isolated communication is insufficient without supporting circumstances.

The Court relied upon State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, concerning the categories in which criminal proceedings may be quashed where the allegations or materials do not disclose an offence or continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process.

It also considered Ashoo Surendranath Tiwari v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI, (2020) 9 SCC 636, on the requirement of sufficient material to justify continuation of criminal proceedings.

The Court further applied the principle that, although the threshold at the stage of charge is not equivalent to proof beyond reasonable doubt, there must nevertheless be material giving rise to a legally sustainable ground for proceeding against the accused.

The Court found that the petitioner’s alleged involvement was not supported by substantive or independent evidence.

The prosecution itself accepted that the petitioner was no longer serving in the Bihar School Examination Board when the relevant examination process took place.

The references in paragraphs 455 and 520 of the case diary showed only limited communications between the petitioner and co-accused persons, including one outgoing call to Lalkeshwar Prasad Singh and communications involving his wife.

The Court held that such isolated call details, without evidence showing the subject matter of the conversations, the petitioner’s participation in the examination irregularities, or any agreement constituting a conspiracy, did not provide sufficient ground to proceed against him under Section 120B of the IPC or the other offences.

The alleged conspiracy was therefore not established even at the threshold level required for framing charges.

The fact that the trial had commenced and three witnesses had been examined did not cure the absence of legally sufficient material against this particular petitioner.

It held that the material relied upon against him did not constitute sufficient ground for proceeding with the prosecution, particularly because it consisted essentially of limited call-detail records unsupported by other connecting evidence.

Accordingly, the order dated 16 November 2017 refusing the petitioner’s discharge application and the order dated 24 January 2018 framing charges against him were quashed.

The application was allowed, while the proceedings against the other co-accused persons were permitted to continue.