Blanket tender disqualification via irrational interpretation of restrictive clauses and natural justice violations is arbitrary.

The Petitioner, a sole proprietorship of Ms. Arpana Tiwari, is engaged in the maintenance of swimming pools

Ms. Tiwari is also a temporary outsourced receptionist at the Paschim Vihar Sports Complex, employed by a private contractor, M/s Rajsheel Enterprises

The Respondent (DDA) invited 11 tenders for the maintenance of its sports complexes

The Petitioner participated in 10 tenders and was initially qualified for three

However, two days before the scheduled draw of lots, the DDA disqualified the Petitioner from all tenders via email dated 25.03.2026, citing violations of Clause 47 and Clause 77 of the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT)

Following an interim stay by the Court, the Petitioner emerged as the successful bidder for two complexes, but work was not assigned due to the subsisting disqualification

1. Whether the disqualification of the Petitioner without a show-cause notice or an opportunity of being heard violated the principles of natural justice?

2. Whether Clause 47 of the NIT justifies a blanket disqualification from all sports complexes when the proprietor is only working at one specific complex?

3. Whether the Petitioner, being an employee of a private contractor, falls under the prohibited categories of "government service," "DDA employee," or "on contract with DDA" under Clause 77?

The court relied on the principles of natural justice as "first principles of civilised jurisprudence," citing UMC Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Food Corpn. of India, which mandates that any action with civil consequences requires a specific show-cause notice

Regarding judicial review in contractual matters, the court applied the "Wednesbury principles" of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness as established in Tata Cellular v. Union of India and Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (M.P.) Ltd.

It further emphasized the protection of fundamental rights under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India against arbitrary state action in tender processes

The court found the DDA’s ex-parte disqualification via email to be procedurally flawed, as harsh actions like debarment carry profound civil consequences necessitating a prior hearing

The court rejected the DDA's "useless formality" argument, noting that the interpretation of NIT clauses was a disputed issue requiring a response from the Petitioner

On Clause 47, the court held that the term "concerned sports complex" limits the restriction to the specific site where a relationship exists; extending this to all complexes rendered the word "concerned" otiose

The court noted that as a receptionist at Paschim Vihar, the Petitioner had no access to sensitive tender data for other sites

Regarding Clause 77, the court determined that the Petitioner had no privity of contract with DDA, as she was an outsourced employee of a private entity, thus not falling within the three prohibited categories of DDA/Government employment

The court quashed and set aside the impugned disqualification, except regarding the Paschim Vihar Sports Complex where the Petitioner is currently engaged

The Petitioner’s affidavit promising to resign from her receptionist post by June 2026 was taken on record

The DDA was directed to proceed with the tender process in light of the Petitioner’s qualification