Bombay High Court orders UIDAI to share Aadhaar enrolment records of Afghan national accused of forging Indian identity, directs deportation and re-entry ban

The State, through the Crime Intelligence Unit, investigated C.R. No. 185 of 2019 concerning Respondent No. 3, an Afghan national who allegedly overstayed in India, destroyed his original passport, assumed the identity “Miraj Tahir Khan,” and procured forged Indian identity documents, including a PAN card, Aadhaar card, school-leaving certificate and Indian passport.

The investigating agency sought from UIDAI copies of the documents and records submitted by Respondent No. 3 for Aadhaar enrolment. UIDAI relied on the confidentiality obligations under Sections 28 and 29 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, but stated that it had no objection to disclosure if directed by the Court under Section 33(1).

The State also sought directions for verification of citizenship, deportation, blacklisting, cancellation of fraudulently obtained documents and preservation of identifying information.

1. Whether the High Court could direct UIDAI to disclose the identity information, Aadhaar enrolment documents and authentication/enrolment records of Respondent No. 3 for the purposes of criminal investigation under Section 33(1) of the Aadhaar Act and Article 226 of the Constitution.

2. Whether, in view of the alleged illegal entry, fraudulent procurement of identity documents and possible security implications, consequential directions could be issued to immigration, police and other authorities concerning verification, deportation, cancellation of documents and prevention of re-entry.

3. Whether the disclosure and handling of the material should be subject to confidentiality and statutory safeguards.

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, empowering the High Court to issue appropriate directions to public authorities; Sections 28(2) and 28(5) of the Aadhaar Act, which impose confidentiality obligations regarding identity information and authentication records; Section 29(2), which restricts sharing of identity information and prohibits disclosure of core biometric information except as permitted by the Act; and Section 33(1), which creates an exception permitting disclosure of identity information or authentication records pursuant to an order of a court not inferior to a High Court Judge, subject to the statutory safeguards and the prohibition on disclosure of core biometric information.

Section 33(2) separately permits disclosure in the interest of national security pursuant to a direction of an authorised Joint Secretary-level officer, subject to review by the prescribed Oversight Committee.

The Court also relied on the statutory regimes governing foreigners, passports and citizenship, including the Foreigners Act, 1946, the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920/1967 as referred to in the order, and the Citizenship Act, 1955.

The Court found that the documents sought were directly relevant to allegations that Respondent No. 3 had used fraudulent material to obtain Aadhaar and thereafter procure other Indian identity documents.

Although Sections 28 and 29 protected Aadhaar information, Section 33(1) expressly permitted disclosure pursuant to an order of the High Court. UIDAI’s submission that it would furnish the material upon judicial direction removed any institutional objection to disclosure.

The Court considered the alleged use of forged documents by a foreign national, the possibility of repeated illegal entry and the broader systemic and national-security implications to justify intervention under Article 226.

It observed that Section 33(2) could also have been invoked by the State because of the national-security dimension, but proceeded under Section 33(1) and its constitutional jurisdiction.

To balance investigative requirements with confidentiality, the Court limited disclosure to the investigating agency and directed secure handling of the material.

The investigating agency was authorised to use the material to complete the investigation and file a supplementary report.

The Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of Immigration, FRRO and State authorities were directed to verify the citizenship and immigration status of persons whose identities were doubtful and initiate proceedings under applicable law.

Authorities were directed to commence deportation proceedings, impose lawful re-entry restrictions, blacklist and circulate photographs, cancel or impound fraudulently obtained identity documents, investigate the document-forging network, and preserve relevant biometric, demographic and identifying information in accordance with law.

The disclosed Aadhaar material was to be securely maintained and not further disclosed except under the Aadhaar Act or an order of a competent court.