Bona fide prosecution of a review petition constitutes "sufficient cause" for condoning delay in filing an appeal.

The parties were married on August 28, 2016.

Following matrimonial discord, the appellant/husband filed for divorce, wherein the respondent/wife sought interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA).

On October 17, 2025, the Family Court directed the appellant to pay ₹8,00,000 per month.

The appellant challenged this via a review petition under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC, which was dismissed on merits with costs on February 19, 2026.

The appellant then filed the present appeal challenging both the original maintenance order and the review dismissal, accompanied by an application to condone a 116-day delay in filing the appeal against the October 2025 order.

Whether the appellant demonstrated "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to warrant the condonation of a 116-day delay in filing the appeal.

The court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, emphasizing that "sufficient cause" is an elastic expression requiring a liberal and justice-oriented interpretation.

It relied on B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy (2012), which held that a liberal approach prevents substantive rights from being defeated by technical delays.

The court cited Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025) to establish that bona fide pursuit of a review remedy, even if that review was itself delayed or dismissed, can constitute a strong ground for condoning delay in a subsequent appeal.

The court reasoned that the delay was primarily attributed to the appellant's decision to first seek a review of the maintenance order before the Family Court.

Although the respondent argued the review was a dilatory tactic, the court noted that the Family Court had adjudicated the review on its merits rather than dismissing it as non-maintainable or barred by limitation.

The court found the appellant’s actions to be bona fide and diligent, as he approached the High Court immediately after the review dismissal.

The court observed no evidence of deliberate inaction or ulterior motives, concluding that penalizing the appellant for pursuing a statutory remedy (review) would elevate procedural technicalities over substantial justice.

The court allowed CM APPL. 19072/2026, condoned the 116-day delay, and directed the matter to be listed for further proceedings on September 28, 2026.